

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of the form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2851; E.O. 8387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION: Kadena AB, Japan
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/14
3. TIME
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. ESN
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-6

B. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 500th MI GRP CIDET-J OFO, Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan

I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 October 03. The first few days I arrived, [redacted] took us on a tour of the facilities and we received training on the Interrogating Rules of Engagement. I believe the training was sufficient and I made sure my team understood them. The training was no different than what we had received at the school with the exception of the use of dogs. The school never taught us how to use dogs and we did not know how we could use the dogs. I do not remember anyone explaining how to use the dogs. I remember in casual conversations that dogs were allowed in hark. I remember thinking if you have a dog bark. I never used a dog nor did any of my team members. Techniques as sleep deprivation were a common thing. Sleep management was part of the Extended IROE and, in the best of my knowledge, was used on occasion with the detainees. On one occasion with detainee 104, [redacted] advised [redacted] that they should use sleep management on him. I don't remember seeing an Extended IROE for that particular time for that detainee. We were never trained on the use of dogs. Everyone read the IROE and signed that they understood them. As far as the commanders go, the training was sufficient. I did believe that the junior soldiers could have receiving more training because interrogation operations in not a science. You never know how a detainee is going to respond in certain detainees. You could never get enough training. In interrogations there are a lot of calls we had to make. It is not a science when dealing with people. New things that are not covered in the IROE come up every day. This statement is based off of the idea that you can't go into the interrogation knowing exactly what is going to happen and a lot of what happens in the interrogation was not planned that way so you have to be flexible and use YOUR judgment to make good sound and morale decisions while in the hark with the detainee. For example, you receive notes from the capture data that the detainee is cooperative so your engagement or approach is to do direct line of question with a pride and ego up due to the detainee's disposition at time of capture. You go into the hark and the detainee does not react to such approaches. What the interrogator should use next is his/her decision because of rapport and time issues. That is the way it was taught to us and that is the way it was implemented at Abu Ghraib. I was fortunate that I had some more experience individuals. I didn't know anything was going on until I got back from leave on around the 2nd or 3rd of February 2004. I was made a section leader for the Force Protection Tiger Team and took over [redacted] team. I was team leader from OCT until DEC (1st week). My team consisted of [redacted] a CACI member (big frontal) [redacted] African American, [redacted] and [redacted] (he was fired after a short time; nothing that had to do with interrogations) [redacted] and [redacted] had their stuff together. There was another SSG from the same reserve station as [redacted] [redacted] name eludes me. He was on the tiger team with the CACI analyst but they were working for [redacted] [redacted] KB's, so I rarely interacted with them operationally. I believe they were placed on my team just for administrative purposes. My team changed after a short time and Tiger Teams were added to include [redacted] in place of [redacted]. The first time I went to the Hard Site was on the tour of the facility. SFC [redacted] NCOIC took us on the tour. The 470th did arrive the same time the 500th personnel arrived, however I am not 100% sure they were on the tour with us that day. I am leaning toward they were there because I remember there being more than 8 people and around 13. There were 5 people from the 470th and we met them in Texas, so we actually got acquainted with them before any one else from the prison. I am pretty sure that they did go on the tour. I was toward the rear of the group because of my leg problem. On the tour I saw detainees mopping the floors. I also saw guys in civilian clothes leading the detainees and military personnel were present as well. I was told the guys in civilian clothes were the Iraqi Police. I did not see any naked detainees during the tour. As far as I know, I never saw a request to interrogate a detainee naked. I do not think anything like that happen. I made pretty regular spot checks and never saw any naked detainees. I do not know who the interrogators get approval from. When I went to spot check, the only thing I saw that was humiliating was a detainee who had a Mchawk. The MP (NFI) was bringing that his clippers run out on him and I felt this was wrong and not helping the issue. I thought he wasn't helping the issue. [redacted] was there and witnessed it and I expected he would do something about it. I didn't think it was breaking a rule but it was truly walking a fine line. There was one time when [redacted] conducted an interrogation of SCIT [redacted] were having a difficult time with this individual. (I think detainee number 106).

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000307

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT Osaka AB Japan DATED 14 Jun 04

B. STATEMENT (Continued)

And in their culture dealing with females is lower. [REDACTED] wanted a male to go interrogate. He wanted to see if he could get something from the detainee. He did not get anything that [REDACTED] had not already have and this was the time that he and [REDACTED] discussed the sleep management and advised [REDACTED] to do so. I didn't like the fact that he was interrogating and wasn't trained to do it, but I thought "He is a major and I guessed he had gotten approval from [REDACTED] to go in there. Interrogation plans were already being written when I arrived at Abu Ghraib. Everything was a bit chaotic. The JDC hadn't been fully stand up. It was a kind of hit and miss on interrogation plans. To say that every time the interrogator went to go interrogate a plan was written down would be false. Support for resources was very limited. There were way too many people for the area we were working out of. People were hounding off each other. The resources we had were very limited; only one prisoner worked half the time. A lot of time we ran out of Interrogation Plan forms so they were written on back of paper. We would scream at the NCOIC and OIC that we needed printing support but there were no printers. All interrogation plan forms should be kept on the interrogation plan. I might sound like a broken record on interrogation plan, but I mentioned it to my Tiger Teams. "Where is the Interrogation Plan?" I stated that we (Tiger Teams) needed to do interrogation plans and they headed to be approved by section leaders and the ICE Operations [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and [REDACTED] was in charge of the [REDACTED] was not around. [REDACTED] was there but I am not sure what he did. Some of the techniques required to be approved were sent soft copy JIDC [REDACTED] would review them and send it up the chain to [REDACTED] would get it back and give us a Yes or No. I know that during the team leader's meeting we were told that we would get a paper copy back but that it would take a couple of weeks to get it back. If we needed an extended IROE, it would take time to get it approved. I don't remember ever having an extended IROE request from any of my team members. I do not think when I was a team leader we had an extended [REDACTED] did discuss sleep deprivation on detainee IUM.

When an interrogator came back from an interrogation with no new information or the detainee just didn't talk, the interrogator would mention to his debrief to me that he/she thinks they need to use an extended IROE technique requiring approval from higher. I would tell them, "Okay this is the procedure memo for [REDACTED] and once I comes back approved, you can do it. But the Tiger Teams would not follow through with the request. I think the reason for this is that each Force Protection Tiger Team had about 100 detainees and the tempo was so fast that the Tiger Teams did not want to focus so much time on the extra paperwork for one detainee who wouldn't talk when there are hundreds more to get intel from. We had about 440 detainees to interrogate and our list was growing up until the time I left when we had about 1000 detainees. I do not remember anyone being naked during interrogations. I can't imagine [REDACTED] would allow something like that to happen. There might have been some of the lower enlisted trying to push the blame up if they actually did this. The interrogators are not kids and they have been trained at the school. For someone to say they had the okay to have a detainee naked is probably not true. I worked with [REDACTED] quite a bit. I know she would not have approved this. The only person in the Command who I could imagine would have the rules for the sake of a positive interrogation would be [REDACTED]. He seemed like a "John Wayne" type of leader who, at times seemed to go outside the lines when he spoke and didn't really care who was in the audience or formation. When formations were called, we would be told to read the IROE but we were not told what went wrong and what we needed to do to prevent it. We just wondered "Why we were resigning?" As far as detainee abuse: I do not know if it was but it didn't seem right. One time when I walked through the hard site, I noticed one detainee naked on the mattress. I do not know if he was chained. He was called the "bottle boy" because he shoved a bottle up his butt. I asked the MPs why he was naked? There were NCOs all around and I thought it wasn't right. I thought that it wasn't right, but they are MPs and I don't know what they are within their rights to do. I did mention it to some people on my team, just because I thought it was crazy that a guy would do such a thing, but that was about it. There was no continuity between MPs and interrogators so that if we see something, we can question it. To me to have a detainee naked was wrong. I was working the day shift. I do not remember who the MPs were. I think there was captain there. I saw him there a couple of times. I can't remember exactly what the CPT looked like, however, I do believe if I saw a picture of him I would be able to identify him. I was in the area about 15 times from October to December. I did not do interrogations but I sat in on several. I sat in the one with the [REDACTED] I guess he was leaving and he wanted glory to take it with him. Another incident I heard about after I returned from leave on 2 February 04. I never saw or was aware of any unofficial photos of detainees. The only time I saw someone taking photos was when we went on tour. He was caught and his camera was confiscated. I knew nothing about videos. I don't remember ever seeing dogs, but I do remember them coming. The night of the shooting, I was in a different area. We were guarding the LSA. I just remember [REDACTED] bragging and talking about having to shoot the detainee. HUMILIATION: the guys with the hair cut. The detainee through interrogator stated they do this without remorse. I think IOR. MPS had done that. I remember [REDACTED]. He was always the one very friendly. It wasn't him. It was another NCO who was bragging about the clippers running out.

I don't really recall OGA except for one time when they wanted to speak to one of our detainees. I rearranged the schedule so that they could speak to the detainee. One of my guys went in with them. It might have been [REDACTED]. After they finished, they simply left and did not say thanks. We never handled another request from them again. We had ISG come try and speak to one of our detainees, but our detainees had such a low profile neither OGA nor ISG wanted to speak to them. We had a job to do where a lot of the tasks go beyond the individual morals and interrogators have to make a judgment calls. As far as women's Underwear: I recall someone saying something about women's underwear. More of a "hey" we should try that. Something of that nature. Nothing formal I remember people laughing over that. I do not know how the conversation started or maybe I walked into it. I want to say it was a CACI guy named [REDACTED] (an older guy). He was on my team. I took FM 34-52 and sat him down with [REDACTED] and gave him a verbal counseling on his job performance and to have him read the FM 34-52 approach, and follow it.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Kadena AB, Japan DATED 14 June 04

STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED] did not like me telling him how to do his job. He told me, "I have been doing this for 20 years and I do not need a 20 yr old telling me how to do my job. I told him not to do things of that nature. He came out of an interrogation bragging that he made a detainee throw up. I believe it was. I spoke with his analyst [REDACTED] and asked him what had happened and he said that [REDACTED] and thrown a chair and caused fear in the detainees to the point that he threw up. In joking he said [REDACTED] was going to try to make the detainee piss himself next time. I sat [REDACTED] down and I told them that I DID NOT want to hear of this again. Your objective is to get information not to harass the detainees and make jokes about it. They both acknowledged that they understood. I told [REDACTED] and he said, "What do you want me to do about it?" I basically had a shoulder turned in me. I spoke to [REDACTED] about other things in particular [REDACTED] report writing skills. I had one guy who worked with COMPUSA who was an investigator and was hired on that experience. We did have a report writing class after that but during one of the classes. [REDACTED] was sitting in the back of the room not even facing the instructor I remember telling this. It is really hard when you tell upper management and you get that in response. You hold this guy's hand? I had [REDACTED] and an African American CACI employee on the same team. I had in switch The African American because he was known to take over interrogations as I placed him with [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] was a strong 97E. The African American on my team was kind of doing Knowledgeability Briefs, but he was hired as an analyst. I believe [REDACTED] put him to conduct Knowledgeability Briefs. I told [REDACTED] that the CACI guys that we were getting had no clue and did not know how to write the reports. Her response was to go over the reports with them and train them. I was spending more time editing reports. It would have taken me 1/3d of the time if I would have written the reports myself. I did sit down the with the AFRICAN AMERICAN CACI guy we had and went over report writing. We were told we needed more interrogations, MORE, MORE, AND MORE. [REDACTED] cared more about numbers and not quality. When I went back to my AO with my Tiger teams I remember saying "Hey Guys, they want us to do more interrogations per day." "It seems they care more about quantity than quality."

The civilian guy named [REDACTED] that sat up in the front near [REDACTED] was a very nice guy that would always listen to what I had to say. I remember talking to him frequently about the prior quality of [REDACTED]'s reports and that I would spend more time going over the report and showing [REDACTED] what he did wrong over and over again then just fixing the report for him. [REDACTED] would agree that he was not a good report writer because of the Interrogator Notes that he edited for him. I believe [REDACTED] had over hear me talking to [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] on occasion. You could sit him in the corner. It was him and his analyst (came out laughing about it. I was addressing both of them.) I did know [REDACTED] I did know [REDACTED]. He seemed to be a very nice guy with high morals. My first impression of him was good. He was very motivated to work. I was surprise to see his name on the investigative report.

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED] (FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, OR ANY OTHER UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

WITNESSES:

[REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 14<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2004  
 at Kadena Air Base, Japan

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
 18 JUN 04 10:56 AM  
 18 JUN 04 10:56 AM

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/24	3. TIME 1406	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS E4	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
A Co, 141 MI Bn, 300 MI Bdc, Utah National Guard Draper, UT

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived Abu Ghraib on 19 Dec 03 and remained until 5 Feb 04. I was assigned as the unit mail clerk. I was not given an overall orientation of AG nor any specific training or briefings on interrogation operations or IROEs. There were none posted in the area in which I worked. I was somewhat restricted as to what areas I could enter.

On one occasion circa Thanksgiving 03 in a MP with whom I was in casual conversation made an off hand comment that they had to be mean to the detainees in order to get them to talk because that is what they were used to - how they had been treated under [REDACTED]. He did not make any amplification of that comment and did not provide any specific details. I do not know the identity of the MP.

I did not see, become aware of, or hear about any humiliation or abuse of detainees. I did not see, become aware of, or hear about any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees. I do not know of any use of guard dogs with the detainees.

Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

NOTHING

FOLLOWS

[REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA

DATED 2004-05-24

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING

X

FOLLOW S  
[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

[REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May 2004

at

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE [REDACTED] OF [REDACTED] PAGES



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 6 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (ISSN).
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ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Micro Park, Springfield, Virginia
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 004/06/04
3. TIME
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: CIV
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 6410 Battlecreek Court, West Valley City, Utah 84118

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was employed as a contract interrogator working for CACI at Abu Ghraib (AG) Prison, Iraq, from 23 Nov 03 to the end of Jan 04. I received a telephone call from CACI and offered the interrogator position in late Sep 03, having been recommended by a friend because of my Strategic Debriefing work and interrogator experience at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). A CACI Program Manager, offered me the position after a telephonic interview. I have had about 12 years of experience in HUMINT, including both interrogation operations and Counterintelligence Tactical HUMINT. I was on active duty with the Army and graduated from the HUMINT Collector (MOS 97E) Course at Fort Huachuca, AZ, in Aug 94. Highlights of my active duty experience include working at the 66th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade in Augsburg, Germany; conducting strategic debriefings for the On-Sight Inspection Agency (OSIA) (the predecessor to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)); serving on a Force Protection Team and Interrogator for a six month deployment in Bosnia. After leaving active duty, I joined the 300th MI Brigade, Utah Army National Guard, at the beginning of 1999 and eventually got a full time position there. In Jul 02, I was activated for deployment to GTMO and served as an interrogator there for about seven months from early Aug 02 to late Feb 03. I then went to Colorado to train elements of the 142nd MI BN (part of 300th MI BDE, Utah National Guard) and then deployed to Kuwait in Apr to Jun 03 to continue training of further elements of the 142nd. I was deactivated at the end of Jun 03 and returned to Utah until I was deployed to Iraq in the CACI position in Nov 03. I arrived at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) on about 21 Nov 03 and then at AG on 23 Nov 03. I was amazed at how things were run and how bad the conditions were. I, along with other arriving CACI contractors, had a meeting with a CACI Vice President who was visiting Iraq. I also met with the CACI site manager at AG. I initially considered not staying due to the conditions and how poorly things appeared to be run, but after a conversation with I decided to stay and see if things would get better. Within two weeks, I realized that they needed experienced folks, and I decided to stay and contribute what I could. A CACI analyst, showed me around AG on an initial tour, but I did not receive any initial training or verbal briefing on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I was provided a cursory hardcopy briefing which included IROE, which I had to sign acknowledging I had read it. When I read the IROE, nothing in particular surprised me about them, mainly because of my experience at GTMO. Those techniques on the left side of the IROE slide were standard techniques derived from FM 34-52. Some of the techniques listed on the right side of the IROE slide were proposed and argued back and forth at GTMO. I believe dogs were used at GTMO interrogations, although I never personally used or saw dogs being used in interrogations. My impression was that the dogs were used as an initial scare tactic to set the stage for select interrogations. Sleep management and deprivation were also used when authorized. It was generally implemented by keeping lights on in the detainee's cell for 20 of the 24 hours and varying the detainee's feeding schedule to throw off the detainee's biorhythm. Dietary manipulation and stress positions were also used, with approval, at GTMO. In possibly Dec 03, I became suspicious of a possible incident of detainee abuse. I was working on the Special Projects Team and was handed a High Value Detainee (HVD) named who was a former major general in the Political Bureau of the former Iraqi regime. had been brought into AG on 17 Dec 03 and he was given to me on 25 Dec 03. He was in his late 50s to early 60s and had borderline medical condition. my team leader, came to me and said that a doctor had told him that if they went any harder on I might have a stroke. I preferred a low stress, calmer approach to interrogation and I think gave me because of this, saying that off, and you're out. The original interrogator, according to the detainee and the second interrogator was (CACI contractor). During my first interrogation with he showed me a large bruise on his forearm and bruises on his head. told me that he had been blindfolded and thrown around and against a wall during a previous interrogation and had banged his head on the wall. He also claimed that he had been wakened at all hours of the night and had lost track of time. I was initially skeptical of his claims because the detainees often lied and made false claims. In reviewing file, I did not find any entries to explain the injuries and I began to suspect that there were one or two sessions not listed in the dossier. Then my partner analyst, told me that was telling the truth, because had seen it. then told me about an incident where had forcibly dragged by the forearm across the gravel.

30. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000312

DOD 000400



STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA

DATED 2004/06/04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED] was my roommate and one night we were in our room and [REDACTED] had been drinking and was telling "war stories". He recounted a story saying he had done a really good job on a general. [REDACTED] somehow got the general's son and had dirtied up the son's clothes and face to make him look like he had been roughed and mistreated. He had the general's son in the corner of one of the interrogation booths and brought the general in to see him. The general broke down when he saw his son and started to cooperate. He said that he had tried the similar approach on another general, but it did not work on him. I had the impression that this other general was the same general [REDACTED] that was handed over to me. [REDACTED] also related a story about another interrogation. [REDACTED] had been working with a military interrogator sergeant and he didn't think the sergeant was very good because he would go into interrogation, just ask straightforward questions, and then would readily believe the detainee's response. Apparently this frustrated [REDACTED] and he decided to be more aggressive. During an interrogation of an unidentified detainee, [REDACTED] hand-cuffed the detainee to the eye bolt on the floor of the booth. The eyebolt was intended to be used to cuff the leg irons of the detainee to the floor, not the hand-cuffs. By doing this, it place the detainee in a position where he was squatting or kneeling down next to the table with his nose right above table level. The sergeant leading the interrogation had asked all his questions, was satisfied with the answers and was finishing up the interrogation. [REDACTED] then kicked the table from the bottom with such force that it flew up and hit the ceiling of the booth. [REDACTED] said that the military interrogator thought the table actually hit the detainee, but [REDACTED] did not believe that it did. On another occasion, I was walking a detainee back to his cell from an interrogation in the Hard Site. While doing so, I saw an inmate on the floor with both his arms and legs through the bars on the cell, and thus arms and feet cuffed. There was a "ghetto blaster" on the floor in front of him with loud music playing. This detainee was clothed, and I never saw any naked detainees. Other than these instances and others previously documented in CID Sworn Statements, I did not witness and am not aware of any instances of detainee abuse. While I saw dogs present within the Hard Site, I never saw dogs being used in interrogations at AG. I never requested, nor ever saw, any request to employ exceptional techniques as listed on the right hand side of the JROE slide, and I never used any of them. Therefore, I don't know who the approval authority was. I understand that [REDACTED] has directed that I not discuss details of this inquiry with anyone other than those investigators I know to be directly involved in this inquiry, or with my legal counsel. I have nothing further to add to this statement.

//////END OF STATEMENT//////

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004 at Meigs Park, Springfield, Virginia.

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



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(Continued)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45: The proposal agency of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION Abu Ghraib, Baghdad Iraq	DATE 21 Jan 04	TIME 11:44	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER		GRADE/STATUS Contractor
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS . deployed with duty at Abu Ghraib, Iraq			

I want to make the following statement under oath:

As far as some of the things we talked about yesterday. The people I suggest you look at is these two gentlemen, I have looked at their files. I sat next to an interrogation that was doing one day, where he was breaking a tables and chairs in the room with the detainee. reputation for breaking the tables in the room. Look into file 155215 He is my detainee now. One of the first times I interviewed him at the beginning of Jan 04, he showed me a large bruise to his left forearm that was about six to eight inches long, and he stated he got it from being grabbed and being thrown around. He had a bump on his forehead over his left eye that he related he received that from being thrown into a wall. He said that the interrogator grabbed him and threw him down. He is evasive and deceptive, but when he is talking about how people have treated him, I tend to believe it based on the stuff that I have heard and seen. Evidently the people who talking to him before I was working him were very hard on him. was the person working him before I think his number is 155800. I would look at the interrogation on 12 Jan 04, of this detainee, and talk to the interpreter of that helped interview him. He should be able to give you more information. I am working his brother at the time. His story is very forth coming and very cooperative. Talk to was working another detainee who is the brother of my detainee; this person related to detainee, I think the number is 155794, as well about this incident. Pull up the fill on this detainee. After the first interview says to put this guy in isolation because he is not being forthright in his information is a young interrogator, he is very excited and motivated, and he believes everyone here should be broken. and interpreter he might have info. has seen a lot of stuff that goes on. is an interpreter with Titan as well. He has stated that he has witnessed some of the interrogators being full. I do not know if it was abuse. There is another incident was involved in where one of her detainees, she wanted to degrade him; she stripped him naked and made him walk back. She was moved into Bn Ops, and taken out of the interrogation role. would know more about that. I would really look at the files for the detainees of was the detainee that was allegedly taken and thrown out of the vehicle handcuffed. I believe the incident was witness by. He is on leave in the states and is getting married. You would have to go through Titan to get his info. was sitting in the vehicle sandbagged, the interrogator who I think might have been grabbed him and threw him out of the vehicle to the ground, the interrogator then yells at him for falling on the ground, and then started dragging or pulling the detainee by the cuffs. This information came from. We were doing an interview and he provided this information out side of what he was interpreting.

Q Do you have anything to add to this statement?  
A No.///End of Statement///

T>N Page 1 of 2



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/06	3. TIME 1830	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS CIV	

**B. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**  
 CACI, 1 CAV Division Interrogation Facility, CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in Mid November and was assigned as a screener. I performed these duties for about two months and then I was moved to the interrogation Control Element (ICE) as an analyst. [REDACTED] was in charge of the ICE. When I first arrived I did not get much training. I do not remember receiving the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) or any information on the boundaries on how to treat detainees by the military personnel. [REDACTED] gave me a hand out to sign and I believe they were the IROEs. I got the impression from the military personnel that they believed CACI employees to have experience and knew what they were doing. The NCOIC had come from Afghanistan and appeared to have been burned out. When I first started screening, we were receiving 300 plus detainees a time. We had to review all the files and I wasn't quite sure what we were supposed to do. I would ask if the only thing we had to do was fill out the screening sheet or continue with a short interview to determine if detainee was an MI hold or security hold. I chose to sit next to the most intelligent screener for two weeks until I understood the process. I did work with a Tiger Team and the interrogator was [REDACTED] and another SPC who was a Puerto Rican. Their supervisor was [REDACTED]. I would spend a lot of time in the back doing research and never conducted any interrogations. I never witnessed any physical abuse of detainees. I did feel it was inappropriate for females to search male detainees. We had a detainee who was a source "per say" who was providing information to us. We had him in his individual room and treated him well. We had to move him to the Hard Site because the room was needed for someone else. I told the MPs to treat this guy well and take care of him. The MPs gave him a shower while a female MP was guarding. The detainee told us that he had a problem with that because his wife had not even seen him naked. We kept telling the MPs to treat him well, but again, when we went to see him the following day, the source looked very tired. The source stated that the MPs woke him up at two 0200 and walked him to the end of the hall. They would make him walk toward them and ask him his detainee #. The source did not know it and he was sent back. This incident went on for about an hour and a half. We finally moved him out because the MPs would not follow our instructions. I heard rumors about things going on but I didn't personally see them. I never saw or was aware of any photos or videos with detainees. I never heard of MI tell MPs to "soften up, or give "the treatment" to detainees. The person in charge of Abu Ghraib was an MP. Later I heard that [REDACTED] was going to be in charge. [REDACTED] was never around. I never really knew what [REDACTED] did. When I first arrived, it was assumed that [REDACTED] was in charge when [REDACTED] was not around. He would address the troop when something happened. He lived with the troops in the LSA. I never had knowledge of anyone using guard dogs during interrogations. I knew that dogs had to be muzzled and therefore no one would use them. The SFC in charge of the ICE put out a statement to everyone, including OGA, that no interrogator would close the blinds over the windows. If they did, they would be reprimanded. In reference to clothing of detainees, when a detainee was taken to Ganji or Vigilant, they would wear their civilian clothes, if they were taken to the Hard Site, they would have to wear a jumpsuit. [REDACTED] was working with an Al-Qaida detainee. He told us he had shaved his beard off. I got the impression from [REDACTED] that he was the leader. His analyst was a female imagery analyst from a unit in Germany. Her supervisor was [REDACTED] (Do not recall the analyst's name). In reference to ghost detainees, I knew of one who existed. But the word "ghost detainee" didn't really exist. We had intelligence reports from one particular detainee and the report showed we did not have him at our facility, but he was there. When I asked [REDACTED] analyst, she said the detainee was providing information to OGA and we couldn't touch him. I am not sure how long these ghost detainees stayed in our facility. I want to report something else. I am now working in the 1 CAV Division Interrogation facility. We often get detainees from 5th Group. The detainees say they were at the Adameya Palace. The detainees state that 5th group is working them real hard, physically. One individual needed a psych eval and there is no way this individual was faking his status. Another prisoner stated he was transferred in the trunk of a vehicle. Some of the incidents reported to have occurred at Adameya Palace are bleeding from the ears and electrocutions. The reason I am reporting this is because several detainees have reported the same thing. [REDACTED] might be able to provide some information because he has worked at Abu Ghraib the longest. There was a huge community of [REDACTED] the MI and MP command and it made it difficult to work with one another. I overheard an interrogator [REDACTED] a tall, black, 260lbs male. Currently working in the Tikrit Division Interrogation Cell) describe an interrogation technique utilizing a cigarette and circling it without touching, the detainees supplies.) The conversation occurred in the LSA [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000316

STATEMENT (Continued)  
[REDACTED] booking area. I overheard it while I was having a cup of coffee. I do not know who he was talking to. This was around the time the ICE NCOIC spoke to everyone and stated no closed blinds in the interrogation booths.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?  
A. No

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

*Nothing follows*

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGEIDAD, IRAQ

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]





SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is GOCSDPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 18 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1983 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: BLDG AT-5636 Gorham St. Fort Bragg, NC 28310
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2003/06/04
3. TIME: 1500 HOURS
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: A Company, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Brigade

9. I, [redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

From 2 Aug 03 to 19 Dec 03, I was deployed to Abu Ghraib (AG), Iraq with A Company, 519th MI Bn. I am a 97B Counterintelligence Agent who performed interrogations. I was also the Platoon Sergeant for a platoon consisting of eight 97B's and two 97E's. My initial mission upon my arrival to AG was to set up operations to conduct interrogation operations for detainees gathered during operation VICTORY BOUNTY. As time passed, the focus went from VICTORY BOUNTY to other operations. Prior to initial operations, [redacted] wrote an Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), which established our authorized limits concerning interrogation techniques. Shortly after my arrival to AG, I was briefed on the IROE and on three separate occasions signed a memorandum stating I understood and would follow the IROE. I cannot compare the Afghanistan IROE with the Iraqi IROE as I was not conducting interrogations with the unit in Afghanistan. In my opinion, the IROE was clear and adequately established our left and right boundaries concerning interrogation techniques. Members of my team presented an Interrogation Plan (IP) to me prior to every interrogation. The IP's included the ability to make requests for various methods of interrogation to include sleep adjustment schedules. After approval, I provided the sleep adjustment schedules to the MP Sergeant of the Guard. The approving authority for most special requests was the operations cell [redacted]. All approvals were verbal; I never received any approval in writing. There was constant pressure to report intelligence information. On two occasions [redacted] ordered [redacted] to perform unscheduled interrogations of a detainee because [redacted] had information that the detainee was lying. COL PAPPAS said he could not tell [redacted] how he got the information or how he knew the information. In my opinion, COL PAPPAS was not an experienced interrogator and appeared to be in over his head with seven MI Bn's and the mission at AG. During my time at AG, I witnessed several detainees wearing pin women's underwear. I questioned the MP's about this matter and they said that the detainee in-processing facility ran out of regular underwear. Detainees were stripped searched during their inprocessing, but I never witnessed or heard of a detainee being stripped as a form of humiliation. I did not witness any abuse or maltreatment of detainees while at AG. I never directed the MP's to abuse or maltreat the detainees, nor did I ever hear of it. The MP's never offered to abuse the detainees for me, nor did I ever hear of them offering to do so for other MI personnel. After the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center was established, the 97B's were removed from the interrogation rotation and put onto Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT). During my time on a THT, I submitted a request to [redacted] to bring police dogs to AG. I requested that the dogs be used to search vehicles as a force protection measure at the entry control points. This request was part of a Threat Vulnerability Assessment my team conducted at AG. At no time did I request the dogs to be used in interrogations or for use of mistreating detainees. I departed AG in Dec 03.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING TO ADD TO THIS STATEMENT?
A: NO
END OF STATEMENT

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [redacted] TAKEN AT [redacted] DATED [redacted]
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000318

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

1500 hours

DATED

2004/06/04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE

HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT

BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4th day of June, 2004

at Fort Bragg, North Carolina

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1993 (SSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park Springfield, Virginia	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) TIME 2004/03/24 1645	4. FILE NUMBER
3. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ/O-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
B Co, 141st Military Intelligence Battalion, Utah Army National Guard, Logan, Utah 84020

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am the Commander of B Company, 141st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN), Utah Army National Guard, Logan, Utah, and, having assumed Command on 24 Jul 02. The 141st MI mobilized on 7 Feb 03, to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. After spending about two weeks and a half at the mobilization site at Fort Carson, CO, undergoing deployment preparation and training, we deployed and arrived in Kuwait on 4 Mar 03. We stayed two nights at Camp Wolf and then moved to Camp Udairi, KU, on 6 Mar 03. I crossed into Iraq on or about 21 Apr 03. I departed Iraq on 8 Feb 04, and returned to Kuwait, where we remained until I redeployed to US on about 14 Feb 04. During my deployment, I took "Rest and Relation" leave from 14 Nov to 2 Dec 03. The 141st MI FWD3 mobilized for deployed with 98 personnel. Most of the training at Fort Carson was concentrated on convoy operations, react to fire, weapons qualification, and threat briefings. I do not recall receiving any classes regarding Geneva Convention requirements or Interrogation Rules of Engagement. Upon our arrival in Kuwait, most of the 141st was farmed out to fill positions in different companies in the 202nd MI BN. Most of my leadership was also farmed out and I personally was assigned to the 202nd Tactical Operations Center and served in S-3 Operations until 21 Apr 03, when [REDACTED] (202nd MI BN Commander) assigned me to be the 202nd/513th liaison officer to the 800th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BDE) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. After the 202nd MI redeployed in Jun 03, I remained with the 323rd MI, and I became the Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) at Camp Bucca. I never saw or heard of any interrogation techniques being used at Bucca that were inconsistent with FM 34-52 and I never saw or heard of any abuses. The Bucca facility was a joint British/US facility. US interrogators predominately used the Direct Approach and focused on calling the detainee out on inconsistencies in his answers. British interrogators appeared to focus on Fear Up and used a lot of yelling. I received word via e-mail from the 205th MI BDE S-3 that the decision had been made to consolidate interrogation operations at Abu Ghurayb (AG), and I began shutting down Bucca interrogation operations to begin the transition to AG. About 23-27 Sep 03, I arrived at AG, bringing with me from Bucca the last six 141st and 323rd soldiers I had with me there. When I arrived at AG, [REDACTED] introduced himself to me as the Deputy Direct of the Joint Detention and Interrogation Center and COL [REDACTED] was the Director. [REDACTED] was the Operations Officer and [REDACTED] of the 519th MI BN was the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) OIC. It appeared to me that they were struggling with the screening and in-processing process. [REDACTED] had been chief of my ICE at Bucca, and I recommended that he head up the AG screening process. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also 141st soldiers I had brought with me from Bucca, were also assigned to the screening team. The process was problematic since few incoming detainees arrived with capture tags or sworn statements. This problem persisted, but progressively improved until Jan 04. My other 141st soldiers were assigned to logistical roles. I assumed the responsibility as the Operations Officer and [REDACTED] transitioned to become [REDACTED] XO. Basically my responsibilities were to manage Human Collection Requirements (HCRs), manage the information flow to CTF-7 C2X, ensure the ICE had current and appropriate/answerable Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and track other intelligence requirements. During Oct 03 and early Nov 03, [REDACTED] was at AG one or two times a week, until he moved there on a permanent basis in mid Nov 03. I believe he moved to AG to help ensure that interrogation operations were producing actionable intelligence. [REDACTED] predominately spent his time with external support functions such as coordinating with other agencies, doing Force Protection things, addressing signal/communication problems, talking to MPs in the hard site area (Cell Blocks 1A and 1B), and attending daily MP meetings. He was not very involved in interrogation operations and left that responsibility to the ICE. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had what appeared to be a good system in place and [REDACTED] apparently didn't feel a need to get into their business. I left on "R & R" leave on 14 Nov 03, and I believe [REDACTED] permanently departed AG two days later, on 16 Nov 03. Inmates fell into three categories: "Security Detainees" - those who posed a threat to Coalition Forces, "Iraqi Police Detainees" - those who were dropped off by Host Nation authorities, and "MI Holds" - those of interest to MI. In mid Oct 03, a "Tiger Team" of five or six personnel from the detention facility at Guantanamo (GTMO) Bay, Cuba, showed up at AG. There was no real explanation about the Team, but it appeared to me that they were there in the capacity of advisors to help the AG process any way they could. There was no direction to implement the advice or suggestions they offered. [REDACTED] and I all talked to the GMTMO Team. The suggestions the Team offered were very good and what [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [REDACTED] PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000320

STATEMENT (Continued)

think we needed. The GTMO process was very methodical and they offered useful SOPs, ideas for analyst support packages, management reports, and various training classes. We did not have the background and experience that the GTMO Team had acquired from two years of operations there, and it was not until their process was showed to us that we were really about to reorganize into a more effective organization. COL PAPPAS was the major decision maker in implementing the GTMO organization and the changes really began in earnest after he arrived there on or about 16 Nov 03. ICE OIC, really took the lead on the IROE. She made everyone sign that they had read and understood the IROE MFR signed by [redacted]. Additionally, the IROE slide she had created was posted in numerous locations around the operational area as a reminder. [redacted] was managing and driving the intelligence cycle and talking to the CITE-7 C2X. The GTMO Team really didn't bring any interrogation techniques beyond those which were listed on [redacted] IROE slide and appeared to think that the techniques were acceptable. LTG SANCHEZ and BG FAST visited AG in early Nov 03. During that visit SANCHEZ asked how we were getting information from recalcitrant and uncooperative detainees. When he received the answer that measures and techniques available in FM 34-52 were being implemented, LTC SANCHEZ asked if we were utilizing all of the available approaches and techniques and that he had not seen any requests for more aggressive techniques. Such requests went from the ICE through SJA to COL PAPPAS, who presumably would have passed them on the CJTF-7 for LTG SANCHEZ's approval. I never saw any approvals signed by LTG SANCHEZ I do not know how many requests COL PAPPAS forwarded for approval. I do know that COL PAPPAS said early on that he would not approve any stress positions, and, as a result of that declaration, no one put in any such requests. I do not know if COL PAPPAS got authority to approve other techniques beyond FM 34-52. Upon my arrival, I heard about an incident of an "unauthorized interrogation" conducted by three 519th MI BN soldiers. I heard that there was a CID investigation and that they had been punished, but I do not know any other details. This was the only abuse I had heard about until CID contacted me on 14 Jan 04 and learned some details of the MP abuses. I never personally observed, nor did anyone ever report to me, any detainee abuses. Although the 205th MI BDE had requested and received military working dogs, those dogs were assigned to the MPs for force protection and security duties. I never observed, nor did anyone ever report to me, the unauthorized use of military working dogs during the course of an interrogation. Interrogations approaches requesting the use of military dogs were submitted thru COL PAPPAS for approval. After hearing about the CID allegations in January we developed a 1 page letter of instruction on the rules of using a military dog. I never observed, nor did anyone ever report to me, the unauthorized photography or videotaping of detainees. I never heard of any incidents where detainees were forced to wear female clothing. [redacted] dealt directly with OGA until he departed the AG. In January [redacted] and I developed an MOU for COL PAPPAS's signature that outlined the requirement for OGA to in-process OGA detainees.

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, [redacted], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[redacted] Signature of Person Making Statement

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of May, 2004 at Metro Park, Springfield, Virginia

[redacted] Signature of Person Administering Oath

[redacted] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/06	3. TIME 1830	FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS CIV	

**B. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS**  
CACI, 1 CAV Division Interrogation Facility, CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib in Mid November and was assigned as a screener. I performed these duties for about two months and then I was moved to the interrogation Control Element (ICE) as an analyst. [REDACTED] was in charge of the ICE. When I first arrived I did not get much training. I do not remember receiving the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) or any information on the boundaries on how to treat detainees by the military personnel. [REDACTED] gave me a hand out to sign and I believe they were the IROEs. I got the impression from the military personnel that they believed CACI employees to have experience and knew what they were doing. The NCOIC had come from Afghanistan and appeared to have been burned out. When I first started screening, we were receiving 300 plus detainees at a time. We had to review all the files and I wasn't quite sure what we were supposed to do. I would ask if the only thing we had to do was fill out the screening sheet or continue with a short interview to determine if detainee was an MI hold or security hold. I chose to sit next to the most intelligent screener for two weeks until I understood the process. I did work with a Tiger Team and the interrogator was [REDACTED] and another SPC who was a Puerto Rican. Their supervisor was [REDACTED]. I would spend a lot of time in the back doing research and never conducted any interrogations. I never witnessed any physical abuse of detainees. I did feel it was inappropriate for females to search male detainees. We had a detainee who was a source "per say" who was providing information to us. We had him in his individual room and treated him well. We had to move him to the Hard Site because the room was needed for someone else. I told the MPs to treat this guy well and take care of him. The MPs gave him a shower while a female MP was guarding. The detainee told us that he had a problem with that because his wife had not even seen him naked. We kept telling the MPs to treat him well, but again, when we went to see him the following day, the source looked very tired. The source stated that the MPs woke him up at two 0200 and walked him to the end of the hall. They would make him walk toward them and ask him his detainee #. The source did not know it and he was sent back. This incident went on for about an hour and a half. We finally moved him out because the MPs would not follow our instructions. I heard rumors about things going on but I didn't personally see them. I never saw or was aware of any photos or videos with detainees. I never heard of MI tell MPs to "soften up, or give "the treatment" to detainees. The person in charge of Abu Ghraib was an MP. Later I heard that COL PAPPAS was going to be in charge. PAPPAS was never around. I never really knew what [REDACTED] did. When I first arrived, it was assumed that [REDACTED] was in charge when COL PAPPAS was not around. He would address the troop when something happened. He lived with the troops in the LSA. I never had knowledge of anyone using guard dogs during interrogations. I knew that dogs had to be muzzled and therefore no one would use them. The SFC in charge of the ICE put out a statement to everyone, including OGA, that no interrogator would close the blinds over the windows. If they did, they would be reprimanded. In reference to clothing of detainees, when a detainee was taken to Ganji or Yuzilant, they would wear their civilian clothes, if they were taken to the Hard Site, they would have to wear a jumpsuit. [REDACTED] was working with an Al-Qaida detainee. He told us he had shaved his beard off. I got the impression from [REDACTED] that he was the leader. His analyst was a female imagery analyst from a unit in Germany). Her supervisor was [REDACTED]. (Do not recall the analyst's name) In reference to ghost detainees, I knew of one who existed. But the word "ghost detainee" didn't really exist. We had intelligence reports from one particular detainee and the report showed we did not have him at our facility, but he was there. When I asked [REDACTED] analyst, she said the detainee was providing information to OGA and we couldn't touch him. I am not sure how long these ghost detainees stayed in our facility. I want to report something else. I am now working in the 1 CAV Division Interrogation facility. We often get detainees from 5th Group. The detainees say they were at the Adama Palace. The detainees state that 5th group is working them real hard, physically. One individual needed a psych eval and there is no way this individual was faking his status. Another prisoner stated he was transferred in the trunk of a vehicle. Some of the incidents reported to have occurred at Adama Palace are bleeding from the ears and electrocutions. The reason I am reporting this is because several detainees have reported the same thing. [REDACTED] might be able to provide some information because he has worked at Abu Ghraib the longest. There was a huge animosity between the MI and MP command and it made it difficult to work with one another. I overheard an interrogator [REDACTED] a tall, black, 260lbs male. Currently working in the Tikrit Division Interrogation Cell) describe an interrogation technique utilizing a cigarette and circling it without touching, the detainees nipples.) The conversation occurred in the LSA's [REDACTED]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000322



2. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED] smoking area. I overheard it while I was having a cup of coffee. I do not know who he was talking to. This was around the time the ICE NCOIC spoke to everyone and stated no closed blinds in the interrogation booths.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement//////////////////////////////////// [REDACTED]

*Nothing*  
*follows*  
[REDACTED]

**AFFIDAVIT**

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 ~~2~~ 9 FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
*(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6TH day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ.

[REDACTED]  
*(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
*(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136  
*(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

CJTF7-TFF-1 (Abu Ghraib)

1 June 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center Records Check**

1. (FOUO) On 1 June 2004, the undersigned and [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] LTC, USA; Deputy Director, Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC), Baghdad Center Corrections Facility (BCCF), Iraq; and [REDACTED] USA; Senior Interrogator, JIDC to obtain all logs concerning JIDC operations between 15 July 2003 and 31 January 2004. [REDACTED] advised that no such logs or records currently existed within the JIDC. He recommended we contact the 391<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion, BCCF to obtain logs and records concerning detainee operations.

2. (U) POC is the undersigned.

[REDACTED]  
Investigating Officer

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

AG0000324

DOD 000412



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODSCOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 8397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/04/27
3. TIME: 1425
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME:
6. SSN:
7. GRADE/STATUS: CIV
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: CACI, Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq, APO AE 09335

9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 29 September 2003 to work as an analyst and was asked to be an interrogator due my background. I served in a dual capacity as an analyst/interrogator. I departed Abu Ghraib in mid-November 2003 to work at the 1st Armored Division DIF and returned to Abu Ghraib on December the 16th 2003. When I first arrived to Abu Ghraib I gave us a briefing on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and I signed the IROEs. I was explained the process and duties assigned to an analyst. I did not receive any Geneva Convention training as it pertained to detainees at that time. I received it a week after I arrived when a Fort Huachuca team came to train the Tiger Teams. I did not witness or know about any detainee abuse, any photos taken or the use of dogs. I was never aware of any MI personnel telling MPs to "soften" a detainee or give them "the treatment." There was always a question as to who ran things at the site. I know that and ran the Interrogations Control Element. I had no knowledge of a base commander played a role though I am not sure what it was. I believe he was kind of in a supporting role.
Q. Do you have anything to add to this statement?
A. No
////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000325

DOD 000413

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[REDACTED]

~~Nothing~~

~~Follows~~

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2004 at Abu Ghraib

\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)  
UCMJ Article 136  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (ISSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Coraopolis, PA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/26	3. TIME 1525 (JLP)	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS 05	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
320th MP Bn, Ashley, PA

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am currently assigned to the 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN) in Ashley, PA, having been the 320th Commander from 1 Jun 02 until 1 May 04. The 320th was mobilized for Operation IRAQ FREEDOM on 10 Feb 03 and assembled at the mobilization point at Fort Dix, NJ, on 19 Feb 03. On 12 Mar 03, we departed Fort Dix and deployed to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait where we remained for about two weeks before crossing into Iraq. Our first mission was to take over operations from the British at Camp Freddy, which later became Camp Bucca. HHC 320th was at Camp Bucca and had about 140 of the authorized 154 personnel. The 314th and 447th MP Companies were assigned to the 320th. On 24 Jul 03, the 320th advance party went to Abu Garayb (AG) to establish operations, and I personally arrived at AG on 28 Jul 03. My Rater was the 800th MP Brigade (BDE) Commander, initially BG Paul HILL until the end of May 03, and then BG KARPINSKI. Upon my arrival at AG, the 72nd MP Co, an Army National Guard (ANG) unit from Las Vegas, NV, was the only MP unit there, and it had arrived at AG at the end of May 03. It was subordinate to the 400th MP BN headquartered at BIAP. Since the 72nd was already in place, the decision was made to reassign the 72nd to the 320th, and the 314th, which had been assigned to me at Bucca, was "traded" to the 400th in exchange. The 447th MP Co arrived AG together with the 320th. The next MP unit to arrive at AG was the 229th MP Co, an ANG unit from Virginia Beach, VA, and they arrived about the Aug 03 timeframe. The 372nd MP Co arrived on 1 Oct 03, followed shortly thereafter in early Oct 03 by the 870th and 670th MP Co, and then the 320th MP Co toward the end of Oct 03. The 72nd MP Co, which had been deployed for approximately 13 months, was then redeployed and departed AG during the first couple of days in Nov 03. The conditions at AG upon my arrival on 28 Jul 03 were not favorable. AG covered a grid square and was divided into four compounds. Local Iraqis had thoroughly looted and stripped AG after Saddam Hussein fell, and there was no infrastructure to speak of. The 72nd had only cleared and occupied one area. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was funding the reconstruction of AG and had hired local contractors to refurbish the facilities. However, there were never any CPA representatives at AG, there was no CPA project officer, and there was not, until much later, CPA oversight of the Iraqi Correctional Officers. One of the compounds became Camp Vigilant, and was designated as the holding area for suspected Saddam Fedayeen members that were to be detained as a result of Operation VICTORY BOUNTY, which began in early Aug 03. Camp Ganci, which would eventually occupy one compound, did not yet exist. Elements of A Co, 519th Military Intelligence (MI) BN were already on the ground when I arrived at AG, and my thinking was that they must be there in preparation for VICTORY BOUNTY. [REDACTED] was already there, and it was with [REDACTED] that I had my first conversation about the delineation of MP and MI roles at AG. [REDACTED] arrived shortly thereafter. [REDACTED] was the Operations Officer that ran and managed interrogation operations, she was the highest-ranking MI officer at AG at that time, and it was with her that I would coordinate any MI related issues. The hard site was still being remodeled and MI interrogations were taking place in tents at Camp Vigilant. I would go to [REDACTED] to ensure we were accomplishing our mission and that we were appropriately separating high and low value detainees. It became obvious to me that the majority of our detainees were detained as the result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, and were swept up by Coalition Forces as peripheral bystanders during raids. I think perhaps only one in ten security detainees were of any particular intelligence value. It appeared that there was an extreme reluctance to release these low value inmates because of the fear that one of them might return to attack Coalition Forces.

~~NOT  
USED~~

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000327



STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Coraopolis, PA

DATED 28 Feb 05/26

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Detainees were coming into AG faster than they were being released. The release process was very slow and laborious. There was a "Security Release Board" that was set up in late Sep to early Oct 03 to review Security Detainees for release. The Security Board was chaired by BG FAST and also had BG KARPINSKI (800th MP BDE Commander) and [REDACTED] (JA) as members. I really don't know how the board was created. I know that [REDACTED] had been sending recommendations for release of selected Security Detainees to her higher headquarters, but they were all denied. There were many Criminal Detainees accused of Iraqi on Iraqi crimes and the criminal element was managed well, and there was an efficient release process in place. There was a "Criminal Release Board" which was headed by BG KARPINSKI, and also had BG FAST and [REDACTED] as Board members. I also had the authority to authorized release of misdemeanor offenders after they had been incarcerated for 30 days. Major offenders still had to be reviewed by the Criminal Release Board for determination. This authority granted to me was instrumental in managing the numbers of criminal detainees, and there was no similar mechanism or authority in place for review of the Security Detainees. The Security Release Board met for the first time in late Sep/early Oct 03 and was supposed to review 20 to 30 cases at least once a week. About the same timeframe (late Summer to early Fall), there were still considerable number of VICTORY BOUNTY Security Detainees of no or minimal intelligence value and they were contributing to the overcrowding situation. Many of the maneuver divisions were turning in very large numbers of Security Detainees that also contributed to overcrowding. As an example, the 4th ID contributed triple digit number of detainees every week. The 4th ID Commander appeared to be of the mind set that they would send every detainee they picked up in sweeps to AG. The divisions would hold similar boards to review Security Detainees for release, but the division commanders frequently overrode the boards' recommendations and the detainees were sent to AG. And along the Nov/Dec 03 timeframe, busloads of Security Detainees began arriving at AG from Bucca as operation there were being transferred to AG. Although at this time the total number of detainees at AG remained about the same, as a result of the criminal releases, VICTORY BOUNTY detainees, and the increasing number of Security Detainees pouring in from the divisions and Bucca, the demographics of the AG detainee population began to change increasingly to Security Detainees. This is when I realized that the Security Release Board was not doing its job and this was also perfectly clear to the local MI folks. The Security Release Board did not initially have a set schedule to meet and because there were two generals and colonel, it was difficult to find a time for all members to coordinate their schedules. There was also the problem that board members, especially BG FAST, had questions about the detainees being reviewed and the process was slowed. After about four weeks, we formed a "Pre-Board" that would meet before the Security Release Board in an effort to anticipate and address the general's questions. This board consisted of representatives of MI, MP, CID, and the Magistrate Cell, and the Pre-Board appeared to streamline the release process somewhat. By Jan 04, the Security Release Board was meeting once a week. [REDACTED] arrived in late Aug/early Sep 03 and he was then the highest ranking MI officer and I worked closely with him. I believed his job to be that if I had a problem or question about MI, I went to [REDACTED] assumed from [REDACTED] the role of attending the MP daily morning meetings. The "hard site" opened for detainee operations on 25 Aug 03. I had envisioned that the hard site would be used as a post-trial confinement area. However, the Iraqi legal system was very slow and there were only about 25 convictions the entire time I was at AG. Cell Blocks 1A and 1B were the Isolation areas. 1B was designated for female, juvenile, and psychiatric detainees. 1A was designated for MI Holds, and MI decided who would be put there. To the best of my knowledge, MI controlled who went in 1A and 1A was exclusively MI. MI was afforded the latitude to pick who went in 1A, and when and where detainees would be moved to interrogations, and MPs would facilitate those decisions. I left the daily running of 1A and 1B to the 372nd and MI. Trouble-makers or problem detainees were put in 1B. Only MPs were allowed in 1A and 1B. The rest of the prison was CPA and Iraqi Correctional Officers covered those area, but were not allowed in 1A or 1B. LTG SANCHEZ had his first visit to AG on 30 Sep 03. BG KARPINSKI and COL PAPPAS were there as well, but BG FAST was not. I briefed LTG SANCHEZ on all aspects of AG operations and I discussed the prisoner population demographics and US Soldier population with him. He basically saw everything. [REDACTED] briefed LTG SANCHEZ on the interrogation process. LTG SANCHEZ's second visit to AG was during the first week of Nov 03. This was strictly an MI function and I had no role in this visit, although I did accompany his entourage on part of the tour. BG FAST accompanied him. He received briefings on MI and interrogation issues. It is possible that an interrogation was going on at the time of his visit to the interrogation area, but he was only in that area for five to ten minutes. There was no one from the MP Chain of Command present when LTG SANCHEZ was in the interrogation area, although it's likely there was an MP guard or guards present. BG KARPINSKI visited AG less than ten times and they were on media days and VIP days. She also came in early December to make a decision on the location of Camp Avalanche and came on Christmas to visit Soldiers. I tried to get her to go see Ganci and the other sites, and visit the troops and detainees, but she was too busy. When she visited AG, she got to go wherever she wanted to go and she was never denied access to anywhere. I personally escorted her on all her visits. On 19 Nov 03, there was an OPORD which appointed COL PAPPAS as commander of the AG Forward Operating Base (FOB). I had been the FOB Commander up until then. I do not know the rationale or reason for the OPORD [REDACTED]

NOT  
USED

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

The OPORD was a surprise to me and to the 800<sup>th</sup>. No one had discussed it with me and I was not consulted about the FOB changes. Basically, I saw no real immediate change in the conduct of operations as a result of the OPORD, as the change was gradual between 19 Nov 03 and the arrival of elements of the 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN. I never had any concern that MI was trying to interject itself into the MP Chain of Command and I never had any questions about Command Authority. I was please to see COL PAPPAS arrive, because he brought with him additional resources. [REDACTED] Commander of the 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN, brought some elements of his battalion to AG in early Dec 03 and assumed much of the base operations. After the OPORD, I would go to COL PAPPAS rather than to the 800<sup>th</sup> for support. I understood that I retained responsibility for detainee operations and that I was responsible for the mission assigned to me. The first time I spoke to MG MILLER was in early September. I believe that MG MILLER was there to give MI an assessment with extracting actionable intelligence. MG MILLER left and he returned to Abu Ghraib, a few days later he returned and I met with him. He tried to give us Lessons Learned from GTMO and what worked between the MP and MI units. He said, and I agreed, that both MP and MI needed to work closely together. MG MILLER wanted the MPs to set the conditions (what he meant was there were rules to be followed and ensure we keep to the rules i.e. cigarettes rations as a reward. MPs control the issue of cigarettes. They would be the bad guys and MI would be the good guy to gather information.) He gave example of how GTMO processed detainees. Not all detainees are treated the same. While moving from Point A to Point B, the prisoners are shackled and have hood over their heads. He did discuss the use of dogs. MI was supposed to have money to build an interrogation facility and MG MILLER gave them options to select from to help them establish an organization and begin construction. In reference to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), they were funding the renovation of Abu Ghraib but they were not there. When I arrived at Abu Ghraib, there were no CPA representatives on site. The military was running the facility. I had requested a Project Manager from CPA to come out to Abu Ghraib to maintain oversight of the renovation project and to have oversight of the Iraqi Criminals. A representative was never provided the entire time I was there. Clothing was an issue at Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib was a rough environment and the conditions were not the best. We did not have jumpsuits for everyone. Those detainees held in the general population got when available and were able to keep their civilian clothes. All those going to 1B and 1A wore their clothing in their possession. Prisoners assigned to the CPA portion of the prison were all issued jumpsuits. The first time I heard about detainees being stripped naked was when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) came to visit Abu Ghraib sometime in October. I received a call from one of the ICRC female representative who sounded frantic and wanted me to go down to the Hard Site. I quickly went to the hard site and was told by the ICRC that the detainees were naked in their cells. I saw between 12-15 detainees naked in their own individual cells. [REDACTED] and chased down [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~NOT USED~~

Initials of person making statements [REDACTED]

Page 3 of 4 Page [REDACTED]

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Around this time, I was moved to the 800th MP Brigade staff. On the 18th of October [REDACTED] came in to take over the battalion. Sometime in November, CJTF-7 sent in some JAG representatives including [REDACTED] (Australia) to Abu Ghraib to try to come up with some responses to the ICRC report. [REDACTED] was there with the JAG representatives. They came to the consensus that there was a provision in the Geneva Convention that allowed them to keep the ICRC from certain detainee classification. The ICRC was returning in December/January time frame and they were deciding what areas the ICRC should go visit and what areas according to the Geneva Convention, they were allowed to keep them out of. Shortly after IA was opened, Other Government Organization (OGA) showed up with two detainees. They wanted to house the detainee at Abu Ghraib for a few days. I told them to process them in. They did not want them processed in. I did not like the idea, but told them they needed to leave someone behind to keep watch over the detainee. The detainee was taken away the next day. This became more of a routine and I became aware it was becoming an impact on MI operations. I had a discussion with [REDACTED] about how OGA was doing their own thing. [REDACTED] said he would write up a memorandum of understanding for OGA. I relied on him to be the liaison between OGA and us. I was never aware of anything bad occurring between the detainees and OGA. The only incident I am aware of was the death of an OGA detainee. OGA had brought two detainees to the Hard Site in the afternoon. By late evening or early morning, one of the detainees was dead. I was told that the detainee had put up some stiff resistance when he was captured and got hit on the head. I told the folks gathered that that was not the situation I wanted to be in, this is what I wanted to prevent by processing detainees. I told them, "You take care of it." I believe the body was taken to BIAP to the mortuary unit there. I wrote up a serious incident report and sent it up to my higher headquarters. On 20 September the night of the mortar attack in which two MI Soldiers were killed, I was notified about a possible abuse of detainees by MI personnel. I spoke to [REDACTED] my S-3 about the incident. The MPs claimed to have seen MI roughing some detainees and the MI personnel claimed to have been yelling at the detainees while they were unloading them off the vehicle. [REDACTED] told me he heard them yelling. I received the sworn statements from everyone who was around and passed them on to CID to investigate the matter. CID conducted an investigation and the incident was unfounded. When MI wanted a detainee on sleep deprivation, they would tell the MP guard that prisoner "X" was on sleep deprivation. They would give instructions that the detainee was to sleep four hours within a 24-hour period. In Camp Vigilant, the detainees on sleep deprivation would be separated from the rest of the group and placed near the wire, where the MP Guard could monitor the detainee. The detainee was provided a cot where he could sleep and would be awoken by making him walk, stand, and sit. In the Hard Site, the MPs would go around periodically and wake the prisoner up by making noise, or possibly putting the detainee in a different position. I do not believe MPs were given specific instructions on how to keep a detainee awake. It was left to the MPs. When I first arrived, [REDACTED] met with me and she gave me a list of the rules of engagement for MI personnel and she explained what they were trying to do. At that time they were focused on the Fedeyeen members. In general, I went to [REDACTED] for all issues after he arrived. I would ask him how the cooperation between MI and MP was going and he said, "Oh Yeah, these guys are great." I never had any issues brought up to my level. I saw dogs on some occasions being walked around, but that was it. I did hear about cold showers, but everyone took cold showers because that is all we had for a long time at Abu Ghraib. I have been ordered by MG Fay not to discuss any issues related to this inquiry with anyone not directly associate with the inquiry. I was at Abu Ghraib from the end of July 2003 to 19 January 2004 except for emergency leave to attend my father-in-law's funeral between 17 - 27 December 2003 and the period 18 - 31 October 2003 when BG Karpinski appointed [REDACTED] as acting commander of the 320th. Q. Is there anything you would like to add to this statement? A. No. [REDACTED]

End of Statement

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of May 2004 at \_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
320<sup>th</sup> MILITARY POLICE BATTALION  
APO AE 09432

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

12 April 04

MEMORANDUM THRU [REDACTED] Staff Judge Advocate, III Corp  
FOR [REDACTED] CG, III Corps  
SUBJECT: Rebuttal of AR 15-6 for [REDACTED] 320<sup>th</sup> MP Battalion

1. I acknowledge responsibility for all actions taken by soldiers assigned to the 320<sup>th</sup> Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN). I have been thoroughly embarrassed and humiliated by being suspended from my duties while the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN has returned home. I acknowledge the failure to implement all corrective security measures as ordered by BG Karpinski and documented in GOMOR dated 10 November 2003. I acknowledge failing to have all soldiers assigned to the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN trained in Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Operations and knowledgeable in the protections afforded detainees in the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War. I acknowledge failing to properly supervise soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib understanding that proper supervision would have prevented prisoner abuse.

2. I offer the following information in deciding on administrative actions to be taken against me. I assumed command of the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN in June 2002. I was selected for promotion in November 2002. In accordance with Army Reserve policy, I found an O-6 position and requested a transfer of units in January 2003 to obtain my promotion. My request was denied because activation of the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN was expected. The battalion was called to active duty on 10 February 2003. After packing unit equipment to operate a 4000 man Theater Internment Facility (TIF), the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN began the mobilization validation process at Fort Dix on 19 February 2003. At Fort Dix, the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN received training on the Geneva Convention, Law of War, and Arab cultural awareness. On 12 March 2003, the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN departed Fort Dix for Kuwait. The battalion was able to validate in only three weeks when other units exceeded five weeks at Fort Dix at that time because of demonstrated expertise in I/R operations. First Army and the 78<sup>th</sup> Training Division used the tactical SOP of the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN to validate the mobilization readiness exercise of all other I/R battalions. In 2000 and 2001, the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN performed its wartime mission in South Korea extremely effectively. The 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN had served as a test bed for various versions of the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) so that personnel were well prepared to process and account for EPW. The competence of the battalion and an aggressive training schedule enabled the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN to arrive at Fort Dix weeks after the 310<sup>th</sup> MP BN and 744<sup>th</sup> MP BN and depart weeks ahead of those battalions.

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3. The 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN arrived in Kuwait on 13 March 2003. While waiting at Camp Arifjan, at my request the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN received another cultural awareness class from the Free Iraqi Force (FIF) which included a mock prison scenario involving female MPs giving orders to Iraqi EPW. On 22 March 2003, the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN operations staff to include [REDACTED] and several other NCOs entered Iraq as part of the advance party for the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade (800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade staff was slow to appear at the TIF near Umm Qasr, Iraq.) By 29 March 2003, I had moved the HHC of the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN and two recently arrived MP Guard Companies to the TIF by commercial 20 ton dump trucks, SSTs used to empty porta-lavatories, and commercial busses. My units were committed to action while vehicles and containers of MTOE equipment were aboard ship. (Vehicles and equipment arrived in Kuwait in late April through late May.) On 1 April 2003, I assumed command of Camp Freddy from a British Air Defense Artillery unit. Camp Freddy was not designed to TIF standards in that compounds were small and located very close to one another with a total design capacity of about 2500. By 13 April 2003, the population of Camp Freddy exceeded 7200. All soldiers under my command were working a scheduled twelve hour shift (routinely working 14-16 hour shifts) without any days off. I typically worked 18-19 hours daily. During April, I recall two meetings that I held with officers and NCOs regarding the review of proper treatment of detainees following alleged events that were investigated and subsequently found to be groundless. By mid-May, engineers had completed the TIF named Camp Bucca, Holding Area Freddy was closed, and the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN executive officer had been REFRAD. (The battalion CSM was held at Fort Dix for medical problems until December 2003.) We continued to provide security for in-processing, the medical clinic, Tribunal screening, and the Joint Forces Interrogation Facility. The 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN assumed some escort missions from the 223<sup>rd</sup> MP CO. On the afternoon of 12 May 2003 [REDACTED] was assigned on the first escort mission along with 9 other soldiers to take an empty bus to TSP Whitford at Tallil, pick up prisoners, and return to Camp Bucca for processing. Prior to departure, a mission briefing was held which included a review of the Rules of Engagement. At this briefing, I emphasized treating the EPWs firmly, but with respect and emphasized utilizing the 223<sup>rd</sup> MP CO personnel to resolve questionable situations (223<sup>rd</sup> MP CO was providing the left seat/right seat ride.) When [REDACTED] returned to Camp Bucca shortly before midnight, she took vigilante justice against EPW that she believed had raped [REDACTED] 4 out of the 10 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN soldiers abused some of the EPWs; a clear indication that the abuse was the responsibility of those individuals acting alone and was not condoned by myself or any leader at Camp Bucca.

4. Between April and June 2003, four different MP Guard Companies were assigned to the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN for varying lengths of time. This resulted in a very dynamic mission with transition being the norm. In June 2003, the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade made me the Commandant of Camp Bucca when they relocated to Victory Camp. During June and July 2003, I was responsible for a population of about 3000 prisoners and 1500 soldiers (320<sup>th</sup> MP BN, 530<sup>th</sup> MP BN, and 724<sup>th</sup> MP BN). On 17 July 2003, the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN was ordered to relocate to FOB Abu Ghraib and assume command and control of the prison complex to include Camp Vigilant, Camp Ganci, and the renovated prison facility. I was assigned the missions to construct Camp Ganci, improve Camp Vigilant, and be prepared to operate the renovated, existing prison complex. I was told by the Deputy Commander of the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade, [REDACTED] that the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN was selected

over the 530<sup>th</sup> MP BN and 724<sup>th</sup> MP BN because the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN had demonstrated a greater ability to accomplish this assignment than other battalions.

5. I arrived at Abu Ghraib with the main body on 24 July 2003 without the battalion S-4 who was evacuated to Walter Reed Hospital for knee surgery. (The escapes and shootings at Camp Vigilant on 4 June and 13 June attributed to the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN on report pages 27 and 28 occurred while the 400<sup>th</sup> MP BN was responsible for Camp Vigilant.) Within ten days, all the concertina wire for all eight Camp Ganci compounds had been laid. Simultaneously, we were receiving prisoners from Operation Victory Bounty into Camp Vigilant and Iraqi criminals into compound 1 of Camp Ganci. We immediately assisted the Military Intelligence (MI) unit with intelligence collection effort by isolating detainees as much as possible and by executing sleep management. (Annex A) Accounting for all detainees at all times was an extremely high priority for me. I asked the battalion S-1 [REDACTED] at least daily if there were any prisoner accountability problems. It was a very rare event when there was a lapse in prisoner accountability. I visited the processing area and the compounds daily and asked about compound manifests. I found the compound manifests to be accurate with a few minor changes required. These changes to NDRS were worked behind the priority of physically accepting detainees, transferring detainees to another detention facility, or releasing detainees. Inaccurate NDRS information does not constitute an inability for me to account for detainees. Whenever there was an escape, a timely report identifying the escaped detainee was filed. I believe that [REDACTED] as quoted on report page 24, to be in error. I believe that the escapes he identified are recorded as e. on report page 28 and p. on report page 31. I find [REDACTED] confusion understandable as he was the platoon leader in charge of escorts and [REDACTED] was in charge of the Hard-Site until December 2003 when [REDACTED] was REFRAD.

6. At the end of July 2003, seven PR&Cs were submitted for logistical support that [REDACTED] 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade S-4, combined into a single PR&C only to realize its impracticality through the PR&C process and was subsequently forced to divide the one huge PR&C into several PR&Cs. The net effect was that support requested in July 2003 was not received until October 2003. Since arriving at FOB Abu Ghraib, there was a continuous expansion of facilities and of number of personnel working there. My schedule at Abu Ghraib consisted of 18-19 hour days without any days off. This schedule enabled me to visit many soldiers and observe operations. I reviewed all statements from soldiers assigned to the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN (Report Annex 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 68, 71, 73, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 101, 105, and 106) and conclude that I was seen frequently while BG Karpinski was rarely seen which contradicts in part paragraph 19 on report page 43.

7. Expansion of operational compounds in Camp Ganci was very painful because of the lack of support. Water, food, porta-lavatories, light sets, and sufficient personnel were issues that took significant effort to overcome to open additional compounds to meet the growing prisoner population. On 25 August 2003, the first three wings and the medical clinic of the Hard-Site opened while the remainder of the prison remained under renovation. No CPA representative was assigned on-site. The Iraqi correction officers assigned by the Ministry of Justice were supervised by MPs.

8. Force protection was a major issue from day one of arrival. FOB Abu Ghraib is routinely subjected to small arms, rocket propelled grenade, mortar, and rocket attack. An internal threat arises from local labor used to renovate the Hard-Site. The 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN provided all perimeter security and force protection until A CO of the 1/504 PIR arrived at the end of September 2003 and until the 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN arrived in December 2003 to assume the northern perimeter and assist at the entry control point. On the night of 16 August 2003, 59 prisoners were injured (43 required Medevac) and 6 prisoners were killed when a mortar round impacted in Compound B of Camp Vigilant and Compound 2 of Camp Ganci. On 23 September 2003, two MI soldiers were killed by a mortar impact in Camp Vigilant. At this time, I requested a Combat Stress team visit. Thereafter, [REDACTED] Combat Stress team periodically returned because of the high stress levels faced by soldiers at FOB Abu Ghraib. This contradicts in part the conclusion reached in paragraph 20 on page 43 of the report.

9. The CJTF-7 IG, [REDACTED] inspected FOB Abu Ghraib in late September 2003 and exited with the observation that "You are the forgotten." [REDACTED] found that we were doing the best job possible with the resources given, but were receiving woefully inadequate support. On 30 September 2003, [REDACTED] inspected FOB Abu Ghraib. He made FOB Abu Ghraib an enduring base. He also initiated efforts to correct deficiencies. My early October 2003 was spent escorting primary CJTF-7 staff officers on inspections of FOB Abu Ghraib, integrating four new MP companies into confinement operations, providing information to an engineer team to develop a base master plan, and familiarizing [REDACTED] (acting as the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN CSM) and [REDACTED] with FOB Abu Ghraib. BG Karpinski reassigned [REDACTED] from serving as commander of the 324<sup>th</sup> MP BN to mayor of FOB Abu Ghraib. (I strongly recommended to BG Karpinski that she provide a staff for [REDACTED] but a staff never arrived.) On 15 October 2003, the 372<sup>nd</sup> MP CO relieved the 72<sup>nd</sup> MP CO of operation of Camp Vigilant and the Hard-Site. On the morning of 18 October 2003, BG Karpinski reassigned me to the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade staff. She said that she wanted a new face and new ideas. She wanted me to work with CPA on detention facilities. [REDACTED] would be the interim 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN commander for two weeks until someone else could be found. She had expected the mayor of FOB Abu Ghraib [REDACTED] and not me to brief and escort [REDACTED] during his inspection the previous day. She wanted CJTF-7 to provide a mayor. Finally, BG Karpinski suggested that I go to Camp Arifjan to meet with the 99<sup>th</sup> RRC Commander [REDACTED] during her visit. I did go to Camp Arifjan, met with [REDACTED] and returned to the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade on 22 October 2003. (Annex B) When I first met with BG Karpinski upon my return, she informed me that she intended to reassign me to duties as 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN commander at the completion of [REDACTED] two weeks. In talking with [REDACTED] he told me that he reported to BG Karpinski that the mission at FOB Abu Ghraib was overwhelming and that there were no major problems with the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN. On 31 October 2003, I returned to FOB Abu Ghraib. During the time that I was assigned to the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade staff, 85% of the egregious acts were committed in wing 1A of the Hard-Site. Some acts also occurred in early November 2003 while I was commander. The egregious acts of abuse did not occur every night from late October through early November 2003; rather, the acts occurred on 3 isolated nights. My oversight of operations eliminated the abuse after mid-November.

10. On 10 November 2003, I received a GOMOR for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by BG Karpinski. In my rebuttal to the GOMOR, I pointed out compliance with all



corrective measures for which adequate resources were provided. I also pointed out corrective measures which were not complied with involved positioning of light sets to illuminate all dark areas that could provide an escape route for prisoners within the grid square of FOB Abu Ghraib and involved the number of personnel to assign to operate Camp Ganci compounds and serve as an interior FOB Abu Ghraib roving patrol. These corrective security measures could not be complied with because all available light sets were used to illuminate Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci compounds and there was an insufficient amount of soldiers to meet doctrinal requirements for operating detention facilities at FOB Abu Ghraib. I made personal contact with the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade S-4 [REDACTED] and S-3, [REDACTED] to request additional light sets and soldiers. In December 2003 when the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN located a vendor for light sets [REDACTED] sent all the light sets to the 530<sup>th</sup> MP BN. [REDACTED] repeatedly denied all requests for forces. During mid-November [REDACTED] was assigned as my acting executive officer. On 19 November 2003, COL Pappas became FOB Abu Ghraib commander.

11. On 24 November 2003, 4500 prisoners rioted in Camp Ganci. While conducting an AAR of the operation to quell the riot, I was informed of the shooting in the Hard-Site. In early December 2003 the 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN arrived to perform duties of overseeing FOB Abu Ghraib operations. Actual transition of responsibilities was limited because the 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN expected to return to Germany in early February. The 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN did not want to transition things twice within 2 months. All units on FOB Abu Ghraib continued to attend my daily briefings. The 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN TOC continued to coordinate internal and external force protection. The 165<sup>th</sup> MI BN assumed responsibility for mayoral functions and the management of hundreds of local contract laborers to fulfill contracts awarded to improve FOB Abu Ghraib.

12. On the evening of 13 January 2004 [REDACTED] turned a CD of digital photographs over to CID. At 2300 hours, [REDACTED] came to me and showed me the photographs. I agreed to assist his investigation by utilizing the Quick Reaction Force to secure the crime scenes. Between 2400 and 0400 on 14 January 2004, I helped [REDACTED] secure evidence and take sworn statements. On 18 January 2004, I was suspended from duties by BG Karpinski. On 16 March 2004 while the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN prepared to redeploy home, I received a continued suspension from duties from [REDACTED]. To this date, I have never seen [REDACTED] Report, [REDACTED] Report, or [REDACTED] Report making it impossible for me to implement their recommendations absent direction from my higher command. I have recently received notification that [REDACTED] will assume command of the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN in early June at a change of command ceremony.

13. In summary, during this entire deployment, I was assigned missions without the resources to accomplish the missions by doctrine. A lack of unit equipment and vehicles existed until May. Other logistical issues were present throughout the deployment. There was a chronic shortage of personnel which necessitated 12 hour shifts with few days off. On the 320<sup>th</sup> MP BN staff, for the majority of the deployment I was without an executive officer, S-4, and command sergeant major. I relied heavily on [REDACTED] to run the day to day confinement operations so that I could concentrate on everything else. The "numerous" witnesses referenced on report page 39 were statements made by [REDACTED] (Annex 64) and [REDACTED] (Annex 80) who worked for [REDACTED] that confirmed "day to day operations were ran by [REDACTED]. My assigned missions were constantly changing, usually growing. Over the course of the

deployment, I had command and control of ten MP companies not counting the battalion HHC. At Abu Ghraib, MP companies received training during transitions that failed to include formal, documented training on the Geneva Convention or I/R operations. I accepted missions assigned, requested support as needed, task organized, and completed the missions to the best of my ability. In my opinion, [REDACTED] ed acts of abuse in clear violation of any standard of morality. Training alone would not have prevented these acts of abuse. As battalion commander, I could not be everywhere at all times and therefore delegated authority. If I were omnipotent, I would have removed [REDACTED] from their duties and avoided the abuse of prisoners and the disgrace to the nation.

14. On the civilian side, I elected [REDACTED] at the end of 2002. I applied for various jobs prior to mobilization. I have a federal government position held open for me [REDACTED] if I return home in April.

15. I offer OERs from my previous mobilization where I worked for the V Corps G-5 to my OER ending in June 2003 to show that I have a history of accepting challenging assignments and doing well. (Annex C) My OER for the period of December 2001 to December 2002 is not included because the electronic copy in my OPMS is for a captain unknown to me.

[REDACTED]  
LTC, MP  
320<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Metro Park, Alexandria, VA	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/27	3. TIME 124	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS E-7/ARNG	

8. ORGANIZATION OR AGENCY

9. I, \_\_\_\_\_, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived in Abu Ghraib on 20 August 2003 and was assigned to the 229th MP Company. My primary duty was as the NCOIC of the Detention Facility Internal Reaction Force (IRF). Our sections core mission was to provide a quick reaction capability inside the facility related to the detainees (security, riot control). For the first few months the IRF also provided security and transferred detainees for interrogations. This ceased circa October 2003 and MI assumed responsibility for detainee transfer and security. Before this mission transfer I had an encounter with \_\_\_\_\_ (sic), 205th MI. I had asked \_\_\_\_\_ for the MI Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and he was very vague in his response. The IROE were, however, posted on the walls of the Interrogation Center. I told \_\_\_\_\_ that my rules of engagement were that MPs would be used first to protect US soldiers and second to protect detainees and that we would not stand by if abuse or assaults were observed. \_\_\_\_\_ responded that I was not a team player and my team subsequently had little interaction with MI. Initially my section consisted of approximately ten personnel and we grew to about 15 by my departure on 29 March 2004. We had five canine teams assigned to the IRF, three Navy and two Army. These teams had initially been requested for Abu Ghraib by Military Intelligence; however, upon their arrival circa 20 November 2003, there was controversy over who "owned" the dogs. I recommended to my BN XO \_\_\_\_\_ that the dogs be attached to the IRF and it was ultimately decided this would be a good mix. The dogs were employed primarily as a force multiplier to support MP detention operations. The understanding was their priority for support would be to the IRF with assistance to MI as a secondary mission. Most of our missions prior to December 2003 were in Camp Vigilant and Camp Ganci to conduct searches of detainee tents. We had only a handful of calls to the Hard Site. Under my direct supervision were the three Navy dog teams \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ and the two Army dog teams \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. They were billeted with my MPs and answered directly to me. The two Army dog teams rarely saw. My section only provided a dog team to MI on one occasion. The day of the riot in Camp Ganci (I believe 24 November, about 4 days after the dog teams' arrival at Abu Ghraib) my teams were called to tier 1A to conduct a search for weapons. There had been a report that an inmate had a hand grenade. When we got to 1A the detainees were all handcuffed to their cell doors. As we searched each cell they were un-cuffed one at a time, moved away, the search conducted, and then re-cuffed. During this search MI asked for a dog team on the other side of the cell block and I sent \_\_\_\_\_. We always deployed an MP with the dog team. When \_\_\_\_\_ returned he told me that MI had told him to get his dog "fired up" and to go into a cell with a detainee. He complied and it was during this time his dog bit a female interrogator who was present. I am not sure if his dog bit the detainee but \_\_\_\_\_ would know. \_\_\_\_\_ told me he had been very uncomfortable with the MI (not further identified) request to place his dog in the detainee's cell and I directed him not to do so again. Generally all requests for our dogs were routed through me; however, later that evening MI contacted \_\_\_\_\_ and requested he come back to Tier 1A again and \_\_\_\_\_ refused. Following this incident I continued to receive requests for dog teams from MI but was very clear with my rules of engagement and the requests completely "dried up" a few weeks later. Any requests were routed from MI through our TOC. We did return to Tier 1A on occasion to support initial or final movement of detainees into or out of 1A but did not support MI interrogations. Other than on one occasion I never observed MI or MP abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib. That incident was circa 23 September 2003. The QRF had detained a vehicle with an Iraqi male and female occupant and brought them to the gate. My entire IRF team and an MI interrogation team were summoned to the gate to take custody of the Iraqis. When we arrived I observed an MI soldier choking and beating a detainee. We intervened and directed the abuse stop. The MI soldier told us he was a trained professional and to let him handle the situation. He was told if it did not stop we would detain him. He dragged the detainee to a vehicle and threw him in. I asked for his name and the names of two soldiers with him which he would not provide. Within 20 minutes of this incident \_\_\_\_\_ IRF Commander, and the entire IRF wrote statements which we forwarded through the 320th MP BN to the 800th MP BDE. I believe \_\_\_\_\_ 320th S3, also contacted the 205th MI BN to report the incident. Shortly thereafter a \_\_\_\_\_ 205th MI came over and told us he would handle the situation. We again asked for the names of the soldiers involved and he would not provide them. On 20 January 2004 I followed up on what had happened with our report and was told by the SJA that it had been referred to CID who turned it back over to \_\_\_\_\_

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000337

DOD 000425

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT 1245

DATED 27 May 2004

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

205th MI for action. I have no direct knowledge of any other abuse of detainees. I never heard or was asked for MPs to "soften up" detainees. Once an MP [REDACTED] told me that "the General" (a detainee) he had transported had his face severely beat up. He told [REDACTED] that MI had done it. I reported this incident to my supervisor [REDACTED] who advised me he sent the report forward.

Q: Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A: No.

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

*Nothing Follows*

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of May, 2004 at Metro Park, Alexandria, VA

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, Article 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPA V1 00



On 10 February 2004, a panel of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence

The following persons were present:

[REDACTED]

The interview is summarized as follows:

I'm Sergeant First Class [REDACTED] 229th MP Company. My sosh is [REDACTED]. I am in the IRF, the Internal Reaction Force, which is separate from the Quick Reaction Force. We handle all issues inside the wall, dealing with prisoners. I work for [REDACTED]. Before, I worked in Customs at Camp Doha.

[REDACTED] reads an excerpt from a sworn statement, dated 20 January 2004:

"The MI person hit him on the back of the head with a closed fist, causing the suspect to fall forward. The suspect was handcuffed, on his knees, and had a towel wrapped around his head. The MI soldier kept yelling, 'Eyes down,' and 'Get up,' while knocking the suspect down, and repeating the verbal abuse towards the suspect. Another MI soldier came to the assistance of the MI person. The 2nd MI soldier put an arm lock around the suspect's neck, pulling the suspect forward from the ground. While pulling the suspect from the ground by the neck, the MI soldier was twisting left and right, yelling at the suspect, while the first MI soldier struck the suspect in the mid-section of the stomach. [REDACTED] IRF Commander, approached the soldier and asked if this treatment was necessary. The MI soldier told the 1LT that he was a trained professional and to let him to let him handle the situation. The 1LT reminded the soldiers that the suspect may be innocent. The MI soldiers continued their verbal abuse, and excessive force. The 1LT stated to the MI soldiers that this abuse was not necessary. The MI soldiers ignored the 1LT, and continued to verbally abuse the suspect and drug the suspect off by the neck. The 1LT approached [REDACTED] and asked the Major if he was going to let this continue. The Major said nothing, and the 1LT stated that he was not going to allow this abuse to continue. The 1LT went to the MI vehicle and wanted to know who was the

SECRET

Finished reading the statement [redacted] continues the interview with [redacted]  
[redacted] responds as follows.

I do recall the incident. We all wrote statements on this on August 27th, about 20 minutes after the incident. I'm surprised you don't have it. 29 January is the second time we reported this incident. We reported this a second time, because we didn't know if this had been investigated. [redacted] a Marine who works in the Magistrate Cell, and [redacted] said he spoke with the 800th, who told the Captain that he could handle the investigation, that they didn't have time for it. In a few days, after that, the CID folks showed up because of another incident going on at the prison.

I don't recall who interviewed me, but he told me this was turned over to CID. They looked at it, and turned it back over to the command. He knew of no resolution to it. I was under the assumption, from CID, that it was turned back over to the MI command, who have since left a few months ago. I think it was the 205th or 202nd... I remember the ISG's name was [redacted]. Shortly after the incident occurred, [redacted] and I were called to the Battalion TOC, by [redacted] and met with their ISG, who tried to do some battle damage assessment.

We did the statements that night, after the incident. We turned them in to [redacted] who turned them in to [redacted] our Company Commander, who turned them over to [redacted]. They went to someone in the Battalion, but we got no resolution from the 800th at all.

I haven't met [redacted] yet, but I know [redacted]'s leaps and bounds over anything we've seen from the 800th. He recognizes senior NCOs by name. Speaks with you every time he sees you. He asks you how things are going. The Brigade CSM met with all senior NCOs, last week, after only being on the ground just a few days. And, within a few days, issued us all brand new brassards. I've hadn't had a brassard from the 800th, since I've been here. I was told we could buy some. I only know of a couple of occasions when BG Karpinski had interaction with any of the soldiers in our unit. It was back in August or early September. She went into 2 towers, and spoke with one of soldiers, who was augmented to another platoon, and spoke about the prisoners. She didn't ask him how his living conditions were; she just wanted to know how the prisoners were. She talked about setting up an intramural inter compound soccer league with him. The other occasion was when Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld came. I wasn't there, but my soldiers said she told Rumsfeld we had everything we needed. She told him we were "Good to go." We were far from "good to go."

As far as the Brigade CSM from the 800th, that was another investigation we brought to the Brigade. The 377th Theatre Support Command investigated him. He came to visit, and had an inappropriate liaison with one of my soldiers. He spoke directly to one of my E4s, before speaking to anyone else. He put his arm around her, and walked around with her. He was rubbing her shoulders, and they disappeared for about 5 or 10 minutes. When they came back, he sat down with her. He was holding his hand on her leg, with his arm around her. She was having some difficult times, with the stress of coming from



Camp Doha to up there, but it wasn't anything that required the physical touching. I think she was trying to play the stress card, to get out of pulling duty. We had her evaluated, and the doctor said she was completely fine. But, several of my soldiers observed that, including myself. A couple of them were so angry, that they wrote sworn statements and turned them in to [REDACTED] our EO Representative, which eventually spearheaded the 15-6. That was my first time meeting [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] came out another time, and I spoke with him about the lack of communication devices. We had no phones, no way of calling home to say we're still alive, even though the mortar attacks happen every night. He gave me his satellite phone, and said, "Call home." I said that's not the issue. "We have 115 soldiers, here, that don't have access to a phone. What's being done to fix that?" He said, "Well send up a request for a phone." I said that's already been done. He said, "Well use mine," and I said, "Well, we need to line up every soldier out here, and get them a free phone call," and he then he told me he had to go.

The only other person I know from the 800th is the HHC Commander, a female Captain. When we were at Arifjan, I had a soldier whose brother was killed. She helped me get all the emergency leave paperwork squared away. And [REDACTED] helped us get up here.

They've never come and talk to us. We'd tell them our living conditions suck, and that we've eaten T-Rations, and that we've eaten breakfast 12 days in a row in September for dinner, but none of those people would come out to see that [REDACTED] and the folks from the 16th are the first people from the Brigade to spend the night at that prison. I've never seen anybody from the 800th come and spend the night, there. They are gone by dark, because Abu Gharib is a dangerous place after dark.

Morale was really bad back in August and September, because we moved from Camp Doha, which has ideal living conditions, to Iraq. But, morale kind of leveled off mid-field. The mortar attacks don't help, and the fact that we don't do anything about the mortar attacks really doesn't help. The 82nd goes out, and the QRF goes out, but from what I understand, if you don't have the right information in 90 seconds, you're not going to get those guys.

I would have thought that a Brigadier General could stop a buck, but I may be wrong. There are enough people, here, that have been told what's going on, that someone should be able to fix this problem. Related to these incidents, my personal feeling is, as someone who's been a cop for 10 years in the civilian world, if they had taken action on this back in August, it would have set the stage that prisoner abuse was not going to be tolerated.

We're a CS Company that was re-organized prior to deploying as an I/R Company. We changed our MTOE, when we left 1 year ago, today. We went to our MOB Station, and we had time at our MOB Station, where [REDACTED] met with the Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants, and we sat down and developed a training plan. We set up Camp

Alpha. It was engineer tape, but it was a compound, and we rotated all 3 platoons through tower guard operations, through internal operations, and escort details, because, at the time, we didn't know what we were going to do. We looked at the METL Tasks for an I/R Company, and we knew there were a lot of things we could be doing. We tried to prepare for what we thought we were going to be doing. It's funny, because soldiers hated Camp Alpha, back in Indiana, but when we got on the ground up there, they were like this is just like Camp Alpha; this is going to be easy. Then, it turns out we were only going to be responsible for Tower Guard Operations, which made it easier.

I don't think you need to have training, to know that hitting someone in your custody is wrong. It's an issue of right and wrong. I've had many conversations with the MI folks after that, and I told them from the beginning, that I wouldn't tolerate that.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave [REDACTED] a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN);
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq APO AE 09335
2. DATE /YYYYMMDD/ 2003/09/21
3. TIME 0100
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS SFC/E-7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
229th Military Police Company

9. I, [redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

On 20 Sep 03 at approx. 2145 a mortar attack was received in the vicinity of Camp Vigilant. At approx 2230 the IRF (internal Reaction Force) was called to the 320th BN TOC and advised that a mortar had landed in the MI BN tent and there were approx. 15 wounded that were being medivac. We were told to stand by there and wait for further. Shortly thereafter we were told to go back to our living quarters and stand by to be called again. About 2330 we were called to respond to the ECP (entry control point). Once arriving we were told that the QRF was outside the wire attempting to stop a vehicle which they believed may be involved with the attack. We were told to stand fast and be prepared to be their backup should the need arise. They soon stopped the vehicle and transported it back to the ECP with the 2 occupants a male and female. Once arriving the vehicle was searched and the two in custody were taken over to the visitor tent where we responded and watched over the two. A few minutes later at approx. 0030 21 Sep 03 a HMMWV pulled up with approx. 10 soldiers and came over to us. The first soldier wearing a desert camo flak jacket came up to the male prisoner and began screaming at him telling him eyes down and asking "what the fuck are you looking at". He then grabbed him by the back of the head and pushed it down into the dirt. [redacted] told him that was unnecessary and the soldier looked at him and told him "that he was the professional at this he knew what he was doing". [redacted] said that doesn't look professional. I then said that I had never been taught that when I went through interrogator school. At this point another soldier (a very large stocky soldier) came over and started yelling at him to get up. He grabbed him and yanked him up off the ground and secured his arms and began walking him back towards the vehicle. He continued screaming and forcefully moving towards the truck. As he passed me I told him to "at ease and calm down". He continued past me to the back of the truck. Once reaching the back of the truck he began striking the prisoner in the back of the head and back. He continued screaming at him to get into the truck. The soldier then forcefully slammed the prisoner into the bed of the truck. Once the prisoner was in the bed of the truck he was struck a few more times and told to put a mask on. When the prisoner turned towards the back of the truck it appeared that he was bleeding from the lip, but I was unsure do to the poor lighting. At this point I asked the NCOIC what unit he was from and he told me the 519th MI. I then realized that these were soldiers from the unit that had been attacked. At this point the vehicle left and the IRF secured back to our living area. After arriving back in our area [redacted] was called by [redacted] and asked that both he and I responded to the TOC. Once arriving we introduced to [redacted] who is the ISg of the MI group. He told us that this had never happened and that had been doing these operations for 14 months in Afghanistan and Iraq. He continued to apologize and remind us that he had people that were wounded and everyone was upset. [redacted] told us that [redacted] had been told and she was very upset over the incident. We explained to them that during our many years of law enforcement that you never send a suspect back to a group of officers that were directly effected by an incident because you don't know what they might do and that this case was exactly the same. We were told by the ISg that they would handle it and we advised that we were going to forward statements of the incident as well. [redacted] advised that he would forward that paperwork to the BN CDR so that action could be taken. [redacted] and I then responded back to the IRF barracks where we advised the team to complete statements of the incident and we advised them of what the ISg had told us. End of Statement

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN 2100

DATED 2004/02/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

////////////////////////////////////Not Used////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED]. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
*(Signature of Person Making Statement)*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of February, 2004.

[REDACTED]  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
*(Signature of Person Administering Oath)*

[REDACTED]  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
*(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*  
A-136(S)(4) UK 4 J  
*(Authority To Administer Oaths)*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 2 PAGES



SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Newport News, Virginia
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/06/24
3. FILE NUMBER: 0815
6. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: [Redacted]
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-4
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 229th Military Police Co., Virginia Beach, Virginia

9. [Redacted] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
On June 24, 2004, I identified [Redacted] from a photospread provided to me as being the unknown Captain described in my January 20, 2004 statement to CID Agent [Redacted]. This is the Captain that I witnessed beating a prisoner inside the hard site in late November 2003. I have nothing further to add to this statement.

Nothing follows.
Nothing
Follows

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: [Redacted]
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

Newport News, VA

DATED

2004 06 24

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of June, 2004 at Newport News, Virginia

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES





SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Metro Park Springfield, VA
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2004/05/27
3. TIME: 1320
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME
6. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS: E4
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 229th MP Company, VA National Guard, Virginia Beach, VA

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was at Abu Ghraib (AG) from late Aug 03 until the end of Mar 04. I had two week mid-tour leave in late October to early November 03. My primary duty at Abu Ghraib (AG) was as a member of the Internal Reaction Force (IRF). For a period of less than two weeks I also escorted detainees to and from interrogation sites. During my train up period after mobilization and prior to deploying to Iraq I did not receive any training in the Geneva Convention or on Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE). I do not remember any training or familiarization on either at AG after my arrival. Other than the incidents which I reported to CID, I did not observe or become aware of any abuse or humiliation of detainees. I did not see or hear about any unauthorized photos or videos of detainees, until towards the middle or end of January when there was a camp wide search for photos; everyone's property was searched and all computer hard drives were examined for unauthorized photos. There was vague gossip around AG about detainees wearing pink underwear, but I did not see it, nor did I hear of any specific instance where this occurred. On one occasion while in the scheduling building, I heard a MI SSG comment about OGA sometimes getting out of control while interrogating detainees. I told him that was something that would not occur while I was there as I would not allow it, nor would any other members of the 229th. I did observe a couple of OGA interrogations but did not see any abuse. Whenever we would hear yelling or other loud noises coming out of the interrogation areas, we would go over to see what was going on, just to make sure everything was OK. Other than what I reported to CID, I did not observe or become aware of any unauthorized use of guard dogs. Q: Is there anything you wish to add? A: No.

END OF STATEMENT

NOTHING
FOLLOWS

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

AG0000347

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Springfield, VA

DATED 2004/05/27

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOT

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of May 2004

at Springfield, VA

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

5 USC 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[Handwritten initials]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION ABU GHRAIB PRISON, ABU GHRAIB, IRAQ	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/01/20	3. TIME 1048	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SPC	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 229TH Military Police Company, Virginia Beach, VA (deployed to Abu Ghraib, Iraq)			

9. \_\_\_\_\_ WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the day in which the Abu Ghraib Prison saw the prisoners not for the first time, I, as a member of the Internal Reaction Force for the prison, was on stand-by for any future incidents. On that night we were called and instructed to go to the hard site and assist the unit running it. No other information was known until we arrived and were briefed by a senior enlisted soldier. We were told that a prisoner had gained access to a handgun and had fired at an American guard. We were instructed that the unit responsible for the hard site wanted our unit to conduct a search of every cell. We entered through the north entrance of the hard site and went to the first bay on the left. We went immediately upstairs and began to search the cells. I was on the top deck with other members of my team when I heard a man screaming from the first deck. I was on the south side of the bay and I looked back to the northwest corner of the bay, through the open center, and observed two soldiers and a prisoner. The prisoner was lying prone on his stomach, dressed in an orange jumpsuit, flex-cuffed behind his back with a sandbag over his head. The prisoner was not resisting in any way. One soldier was standing next to the left side of the prisoner's head with the barrel of his rifle pressed against the prisoner's head. I observed the other soldier kneeling next to the right side of the prisoner at approximately waist level. I observed this soldier begin to strike the prisoner in the small of the back with a closed fist. The soldier struck the prisoner approximately ten times. The soldier then stood up and kicked the prisoner in the right hip and right side approximately three times. I observed that this soldier was a white male with blond hair, cut very close on the sides with a flat-top style on top. This soldier was wearing a solid, olive-green vest with two pouches on the left and right sides at the rear, at the bottom of the vest. I was not able to identify this soldier until I observed him several days later in the dining facility and saw that he was a Captain. I was not able to see this Captain's name. The other members of my team that were present during this incident were \_\_\_\_\_ have since returned to the

\_\_\_\_\_ have since returned to the \_\_\_\_\_  
Soldiers are now assigned to the Internal Reaction Force, 229th MP Company.

- Q. Do you know the date of the incident?
- A. No, sir I do not. I believe it was in Nov 03
- Q. When were you assigned to the IRF?
- A. Aug 03.
- Q. Did you observe the detainee resisting at any time before, during or after the incident in question?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Do you know who the soldier was with the weapon?
- A. No, sir. He never looked up. I could not see his face.
- Q. Can you describe the soldier with the weapon?
- A. Other than white male, no sir.
- Q. Was there any other soldiers observing this incident?
- A. From my location I could not tell if anyone was observing what I saw
- Q. Did anyone from your team observe the incident?
- A. I am not sure, sir.
- Q. How long did the incident last?
- A. No more than five minutes.
- Q. What were you doing when this was going on?
- A. Searching the south side of the second deck. I heard the screaming while conducting the searches, I looked down at the incident. I continued with the searches glancing down at the incident and at some points they had stripped the prisoner and moved him from my view.
- Q. Did anyone say anything to this CPT?
- A. Not that I saw.
- Q. Did you report this to anyone other than this office?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

For Official Use Only Exhibit 2 ✓

Statement of [REDACTED] taken on 20 Jan 04, at the Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

- A. Not officially. I discussed it with certain members of the IRF as a whole.
- Q. Was the CPT striking the detainee with an open or closed fist?
- A. Closed fist.
- Q. Did you see what led up to this incident?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Could you hear what was being said to the detainee?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Could you describe the detainee?
- A. Male, dark hair and an orange jumpsuit.
- Q. Where exactly was the detainee struck?
- A. The detainee was struck in the small of the back by the CPT. He was using his right hand.
- Q. After you finished your search did you see the detainee again?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Did you see the CPT in the isolation area again?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Have you witnessed any other incidents of concern?
- A. In September of 2003, when we first arrived at the prison complex, I observed that the prisoners at the compounds were receiving punishment in the way of being forced to kneel on gravel until their knees were bleeding. I stopped this punishment whenever I observed it and brought it to the attention of [REDACTED] the IRF commander. This type of punishment stopped. Also in September of 2003, I observed an MI soldier choke and strike a prisoner in the presence of [REDACTED]. This incident was reported to my chain of command. Sworn statements were written and presented to [REDACTED]. I heard nothing more from this incident.
- Q. Do you know what action was taken on the second incident?
- A. I was not present when it was discussed. I heard that MI personnel came over and apologized for their actions.
- Q. Have you heard of any other incidents of maltreatment towards the detainees?
- A. The same night the CPT struck the detainee, I heard one of the navy dogs had bitten a prisoner that was flex-i-cuffed and was not resisting.
- Q. Do you know who witnessed this incident?
- A. [REDACTED] was the dog handler whose dogs bit the detainee.
- Q. Do you know the details of this incident?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Do you have anything else to add to your statement?
- A. No, sir.///END OF STATEMENT///

Initials [REDACTED]

Page 2 of 3 Pages

For Official Use Only

AG0000350

DOD 000438

STATEMENT OF

[REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

Abu Ghraib Prison

DATED

20 JAN 04

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Large empty space for the statement content]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3; FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
Signature of Person Making Statement

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of Jan, 2004 at Abu Ghraib Prison Abu Ghraib, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
Signature of Person Administering Oath

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
Typed Name of Person Administering Oath

ADJ ISG UCMC  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY





Statement of [REDACTED] taken on 20 Jan 04, at the Abu Ghraib Prison, Abu Ghraib, Iraq.

- A. Not officially. I discussed it with certain members of the IRF as a whole.
- Q. Was the CPT striking the detainee with an open or closed fist?
- A. Closed fist.
- Q. Did you see what led up to this incident?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Could you hear what was being said to the detainee?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Could you describe the detainee?
- A. Male, dark hair and an orange jumpsuit.
- Q. Where exactly was the detainee struck?
- A. The detainee was struck in the small of the back by the CPT. He was using his right hand.
- Q. After you finished your search did you see the detainee again?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Did you see the CPT in the isolation area again?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Have you witnessed any other incidents of concern?
- A. In September of 2003, when we first arrived at the prison complex, I observed that the prisoners at the compounds were receiving punishment in the way of being forced to kneel on gravel until their knees were bleeding. I stopped this punishment whenever I observed it and brought it to the attention of [REDACTED] the IRF commander. This type of punishment stopped. Also in September of 2003, I observed an MI soldier choke and strike a prisoner in the presence of [REDACTED]. This incident was reported to my chain of command. Sworn statements were written and presented to [REDACTED]. I heard nothing more from this incident.
- Q. Do you know what action was taken on the second incident?
- A. I was not present when it was discussed. I heard that MI personnel came over and apologized for their actions.
- Q. Have you heard of any other incidents of maltreatment towards the detainees?
- A. The same night the CPT struck the detainee, I heard one of the navy dogs had bitten a prisoner that was flex-i-cuffed and was not resisting.
- Q. Do you know who witnessed this incident?
- A. [REDACTED] was the dog handler whose dogs bit the detainee.
- Q. Do you know the details of this incident?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Do you have anything else to add to your statement?
- A. No, sir. //END OF STATEMENT//

Sep 2003  
23. Aug 2003 ?? [REDACTED]

Initials [REDACTED]

Page 2 of 3 Pages

For Official Use Only

Exhibit 2



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 304; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/07/09	3. TIME 0935	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ/O4	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
6th Battalion, 98th Division (IT) Devens, MA

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 8 July 2004, I was interviewed by LTG JONES via telephone. The following are answers to questions posed to me by LTG JONES: My Background: I am currently the S-3 for the 6th Battalion, 98th Division (Institutional Training), Devens, MA. I deployed to Iraq from March 03 to November 03 and was the Watch Officer for the C2X, CJTF-7. I have been interviewed about this matter (Possible comments made by LTG SANCHEZ during a VTC) a couple of times about three weeks ago by Department of the Army Inspector General. I attended the CJTF-7 CDR's BUBs daily at 1845 hours from June to October 03. I was the C2X representative and attended on a daily bases until right before I departed. Toward the end of my tour, I began to skip a few because the C2X had too many representatives attending. ROE: What was my understanding of the ROE for combat Operations? I am pretty much aware of them. I know that if I am being fired back, I can return fire. We were given wallet size cards to carry at all times. Given the following circumstances, what would the ROE allow U.S. forces to do: US Forces are engaged by a hostile force; the hostile force is armed and has fired upon U.S. Forces. The hostile force is now maneuvering away from our forces, but has not laid down its arms and not indicated surrender in any way. What are the Options for U.S. Forces? That's a tough one because I know two ROEs. My civilian (I am a police officer) and the military ROE. In the civilian scenario, if an individual is running away and pose no threat, we do not fire. If fired upon, we can return fire but if there are civilians in the vicinity or there is a chance of bystanders being hurt, we have to make the call. In reference to this particular scenario, I would have to think about this. In reference to LTG SANCHEZ making the statement of "why are we detaining these people, we should be killing them." I never heard such statement from LTG-SANCHEZ. That was a rumor that [REDACTED] and I discussed. We discarded it as hear say. It never came up the following day from anyone. There were so many people present during the BUBs and I never heard it from anyone else. All Divisions had representatives, the Coalition personnel were present, CJTF primary staff was present as well. For the C2, the representative was [REDACTED] initially and then MG FAST attended once she was on board as the C2. Most BUBs were focused on the operations and specific event in the AO. The number of detainees captured was briefed and I would brief the number of detainees captured for specific operations. I never heard such statement and I can't remember when [REDACTED] and I discussed it. It never struck on my head.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement? A. No. [REDACTED]

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DATED

9. STATEMENT (Continued)  
NOT USED.....

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of JULY, 2004 at 370 Jay Street, Brooklyn NY

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authentic To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 100-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1945 (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION 94th RRC, Devcon, MA (U) P.	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/27	3. TIME [REDACTED]	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ/O-4	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 6th Battalion, 98th Division (IT), Devcon, MA			

9. [REDACTED], I WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am currently assigned as the S-3 (35E) Officer with 6th Battalion (BN), 98th Division (Institutional Training), Devcon, MA. On 10 Mar 03, I was mobilized and cross-leveled to B Co, 325th MI BN, which had mobilized on 10 Feb 03 and was already processing and training at Fort Dix, NJ. I was only at Fort Dix for about two weeks when B Co, 325th departed Dix and arrived in Kuwait on 28 Mar 03. We were in Kuwait for about three to three and a half weeks waiting on our equipment via ship, creating and configuring the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs), and preparing to convoy into Iraq once the war began. On or about 27 Apr 03, we convoyed to Balad, Iraq, about 70 miles north of Baghdad, where I was transferred from B Co to the 325th battalion staff and served as the Counterintelligence (CI) Officer. My main responsibility as the CI Officer was to task and track the 325th THTs. About 10 Jun 03, I was transferred to the CJTF-7 staff and was assigned to the C2X shop working for [REDACTED] from the 221st MI BN, California Army National Guard, who was the CX2 until he departed on 18 Nov 03. [REDACTED] then became the C2X and [REDACTED] became the TFCICA. I would not say that I was part of the discussion concerning using Abu Ghariib (AG). [REDACTED] I was aware of the proposal to make AG a central detention facility. I did not think AG was a very good choice considering the AG's history and association with the Hussein Regime. Later on (date?) there was then discussion about making AG a central interrogation facility as well and concentrating detainees of intelligence value there. Up until this point, Camp Cropper was the facility for detainees of intelligence interest and I do not know why the decision was made to close Cropper and move security detainees to the criminal facility at AG. I assumed that LTG SANCHEZ and BG FAST made the decision, but I do not know. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also working in the CJTF-7 C2X shop went on a site survey of AG, but I really had no knowledge of the decision making process. As a C2X staff officer, I worked periodically with [REDACTED] and Camp Cropper and then at AG, and also [REDACTED], who was the Officer-in-Charge of the interrogation operations. Most of my communication with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was via e-mail and less frequently by telephone for time sensitive issues. Most of my communication was focused on inquiries about specific detainees, as I had the responsibility of daily briefing the CJTF Command about the status of significant detainees and what information the interrogators had on them. I was not involved in the staffing process of the Interrogation Rules of Engagement request that was sent up from [REDACTED] at AG. I was a Battle Captain at the time and I was only tasked to find an Interrogation SOP for modification and implementation. I tried to go to the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, but was unsuccessful in directly obtaining any assistance. I then contacted a colonel (I can't recall his name) at CENTCOM Headquarters and asked for his assistance in acquiring the GTMO SOP, but I never heard anything back from him. It was shortly thereafter that MG Miller's GTMO "Tiger Team" arrived to offer assistance at AG. I do not know who was staffing the IROE request, although it could have been the 205th MI BDE doing it, as COL PAPPAS had a strong interest in AG operations and was basically running his own little C2X shop at the 205th. I personally never saw the IROE request and was never consulted about it. On one occasion, I filled in for [REDACTED] and sat in on a Detainee Release Board that met once a week to determine which detainees would be released from AG. That Board also had BG KARPINSKI and BG FAST as members. I am a New York City police officer in my civilian job and, looking at the situation from a police perspective, I believed there were some problems with the retention and release policies and criteria at the Board. It appeared many detainees had been brought in and were being held without any real probable cause, often times being rounded up just because they were of military service age or were in the vicinity of a raid. As there were not enough screeners to properly categorize the detainees, a great number probably ended up at AG when they shouldn't have. I would estimate that only about 15 percent of the detainees were of any real intelligence value, and the retention of the others contributed to the overcrowding of AG. Additionally, because of what appeared to be a reluctance to release the security detainees, very few were released as a result of the board. There is nothing else I would like to add to this statement.

END OF STATEMENT

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED [REDACTED]"  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Devens, MA

DATED 2004/05/27

9. STATEMENT (Continued)



NOT

USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE [REDACTED] FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of May, 2004 at 94th RRC, Devens, MA

WITNESSES:

[REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

5 U.S.C. 303

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSNI).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/03	3. TIME 1210	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME		6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS CIV
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CJTF-7 C2X, Camp Victory, Baghdad Iraq, APO AE 09342			

9. I, [REDACTED], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 5 October. My duties were site manager for CACI contractors and as an interrogator. Due to my duties as Site Manager I was only involved in two interrogations and observe a few others. It basically kept me from conducting interrogations due to the site managing duties taking up all my time. Before arriving in country, we in-processed through CRC and received and signed the CACI Code of Ethics (Copy has been furnished). Some contractors signed it in Iraq. There are two Code of Conducts. One for operations in other areas and one for operations in Iraq. The latter came in at a later time, dated 22 Nov 2003. Once on the ground at Abu Ghraib, We received training on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and we signed the IROEs. Nothing we were briefed was out of the ordinary from the Interrogation Field Manual or what we had learned at the schoolhouse. I felt pretty comfortable with the interrogation procedures in place. I understood and believed the rest of the CACI contractors understood the IROE quite well. [REDACTED] briefed us on the concept of Tiger Teams (1 x interrogator, 1 x Analyst, 1 x Translator). We were given an orientation and tour of Abu Ghraib. After two weeks on the ground (around 20 October), two Mobile Training Teams came to Abu Ghraib to train us. The team from GTMC instructed us on Arab culture, the history plus other subjects and helped guide the JIDC with the GTMO Tigr Team Concept. The Team from Fort Huachuca focused on training; report writing, interrogation techniques plus other subject. I know that the Geneva Convention was covered during this training. [REDACTED] was in charge of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE), [REDACTED] was in charge of Operations, and there was another operations officer but I don't remember him but he didn't really come to the site. I am not really sure who was in charge. There were many units and organizations on the ground. I didn't really interact with the MPs and do not know who was in charge of the MPs. Who was in charge of Abu Ghraib, until COL PAPPAS became the FOB commander. I do not know. COL PAPPAS was the commander for the MI units. Even though he didn't stay on site, his presence was there. The first recollection I have of [REDACTED] was sometime mid October. I would go to him when I had issues because he got things done. He was everywhere. He was the go to guy who made things happen. When COL PAPPAS took charge of the FOB that was good news because now we had one person in charge. My view is that MI Cdrs should focus on the MI mission and the MP Commander should be the one in charge of detainee operations due to doctrinal MP duties and responsibilities. But it was good that one person was in charge. I was never made aware of or saw any detainee abuse, photos of detainees being abused or videos of detainees being abuse. The only incident I became aware of was the one with [REDACTED] mentioned it to me and I believe he is the one who reported it to higher. [REDACTED] was taken out of interrogation operations but I never heard of it again and it really wasn't discussed. I do not know of any disciplinary actions taken. I did hear of dogs being used but the use of dogs had to be approved by higher. I never heard or saw any dog bite a detainee. One of the problems I saw as soon as we arrived was the lack of resources; not enough computers (ours did not arrive until November); the paucity of logistical and personnel support was a detriment to the mission. We were issued the majority our TA-50 at Fort Bliss, Kuwait or upon arrival in Iraq. There were also not enough MPs for escorting detainees, supervising detainees nor for Force Protection; Internal Quick Response Force (IQRF) or the External QRF. We had frequent mortal attacks in the evenings but then the attacks began to occur during the daylight hours in January 04. There was some concern about the safety of personnel since we were conducting some operations outside of hard sites. Most of the CACI contractors were concerned that they did not have a weapon to defend themselves. The International Community Red Cross (ICRC) came to visit Abu Ghraib about three to four times. I was never made aware of any issues that the ICRC had identified. There was a contractor named [REDACTED] who had personal issues with other contractors (was perceived to not play well with others). He was reassigned to I Armor Division Interrogation Facility. He worked there for a while and return to Abu Ghraib where he worked in the Detainee Assessment Board. He and the Chief Supervisor had differences as to his screening techniques. The Supervisor [REDACTED] felt [REDACTED] screening techniques were too aggressive for the screening mission. [REDACTED] at times would go beyond using the direct approach, but there was never any abuse to detainees. On 21 December 2003 [REDACTED] left Abu Ghraib, CACI employment with hours of notice. I had a concern with Iraqi security Guards being used to guard the entrance to outside of the Isolation Area (the U.S. side). I brought this issue up during one of the morning meetings. At that point, I was told it was being addressed. A few weeks after that, the shooting in the prison occur. I was shown a few photos with military personnel, civilians, and detainees

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF [REDACTED]
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT Camp Victory

DATED 2004/05/03

STATEMENT (Continued)

I was able to identify [REDACTED] (CACI contractor and [REDACTED] TITAN Linguist on three photos. I was also able to identify [REDACTED] TITAN Linguist [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on a photo with an individual who appears to be a detainee who seems to be in a stress position. Possibly being interrogated. The other photos are photos of [REDACTED] a regular pose with other detainees. The photo with [REDACTED] has a naked individual on the ground with other military person around. [REDACTED] is sitting on the floor leaning on the wall. Before the photos were shown to me, I had never seen any images of detainee abuse.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No

End of Statement

Nothing

follows

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 03 day of MAY, 2004 at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD IRAQ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1983 /SSN/  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION 205th MI BDE HQ, WAAF Bldg 1031 Rm 104	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/19	3. TIME 1530	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME [REDACTED]	6. SSN [REDACTED]	7. GRADE/STATUS O4/AD	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
HHD/205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE APO AE 09096 (USAREUR)

9. [REDACTED] WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

In response to a question about when I first became involved with Abu Ghraib and what was my role, I first became involved with Abu Ghraib when I assumed the position of Deputy Commander (DCO), 205th MI BDE at the end of July 2003. At that time, our Brigade had tasked the 519th MI Battalion to stand up the Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SFIF), a temporary facility in support of CJTF-7 Operation Victory Bounty in August. In September the CJTF-7 made the decision that all interrogation operations would be consolidated at Abu Ghraib and in October it was deemed an enduring Base camp. As the DCO, I had brigade staff oversight for many of the improvements the brigade was trying to make at Abu Ghraib. The S-4, [REDACTED] worked closely with the 800th MP Brigade S-4 and the CJTF-7 C-4 staff to purchase quality of life enhancements and infrastructure needs for the soldiers at Abu Ghraib; throughout the fall, the S-3, [REDACTED] and his staff were working on multiple actions related to standing up a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC): they worked with CJTF-7 on the Request for Forces (RFF) that would allow us to structure the JIDC along the lines of the GTMO organization; they worked with the C2 staff to request a GTMO Tiger Team to embed into operations and train the JIDC; they built the line and block chart and identified the required resources, where we had gaps and how we were going to overcome them; they developed the JIDC battle rhythm and the interrogation prioritization process. The S-2, [REDACTED] was focused on ensuring the soldiers and civilians in the JIDC either had Top Secret clearances or were being processed for them; establishing the Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (TSCIF); and, establishing the intelligence architecture that would allow the JIDC to access JWICS and TS databases, which was a recommendation from MG MILLER'S visit. The S-2 also attended CJTF-7 Targeting meetings to ensure that the JIDC priorities were in concert with the CJTF-7 targeting priorities. The S-6, [REDACTED] and the Information Management Officer (IMO) [REDACTED] were focused on tactical communications for command and control throughout the brigade, information management support for the servers in Balad and Abu Ghraib that housed our intelligence databases, improving the intelligence architecture (in concert with the S2), and installing the MWR packages for Abu Ghraib and other brigade locations.

COL PAPPAS was working on a strategy for how we would implement the findings and recommendations from the MG MILLER report and the CJTF-7 CG's guidance from a briefing COL PAPPAS gave to LTG SANCHEZ on 11 September. In particular, COL PAPPAS was focused on aligning our operations with a GTMO-like model and on consolidating our three interrogation facilities at Camp Cropper (run by the 325th MI Battalion), Camp Bucca (run by the 323d MI Battalion), and Abu Ghraib (run by the 519th MI Battalion) into one. Placing the right staff out to the JIDC was a high priority. COL PAPPAS immediately placed [REDACTED] then the Assistant Brigade S3, at Abu Ghraib as the operations officer. The CJTF-7 CG, LTG SANCHEZ, told COL PAPPAS that the JIDC probably needed an O-5 on the ground to run the JIDC. The 205th MI Brigade did not have any O-5s available to fulfill this role. I was present for a conversation between [REDACTED] and COL PAPPAS reference placing [REDACTED] a newly arrived C2 staff officer, at the JIDC. If I remember correctly, [REDACTED] thought that based on [REDACTED] civilian experience, he would be a good candidate to run the JIDC. My understanding was that [REDACTED] was sent to the JIDC to serve as its director.

Part of standing up the JIDC included moving the Brigade's interrogation operations at Camps Bucca and Cropper to Abu Ghraib by the 1 October consolidation deadline set by CJTF-7. [REDACTED] was in charge of a small team of interrogators that had been operating at Camp Bucca for months. He was selected to be the JIDC operations officer because of his experience in Bucca. Upon [REDACTED] arrival on or about 25 September [REDACTED] transitioned his title to XO, second in charge to [REDACTED].

In response to a question about how it is possible that [REDACTED] saw their roles differently from the way COL PAPPAS did, it would not surprise me if [REDACTED] said he was the one in charge of interrogation operations at the JIDC. COL PAPPAS initially told him that he would be the 'go to guy,' prior to the C2 staff offering [REDACTED] to run [REDACTED].

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] TAKEN AT [REDACTED] DATED [REDACTED]'

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AG0000359

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

WAAF Bldg 1031

DATED

2004/05/19

## B. STATEMENT (Continued)

the JIDC. I think that [REDACTED] was very proud that COL PAPPAS had the confidence in him to make him the initial operations officer at Abu Ghraib and he worked very hard to make it work. Once [REDACTED] was placed in charge, there were numerous occasions when COL PAPPAS called out to the JIDC and [REDACTED] was readily available to answer any questions when often [REDACTED] was either not readily available or did not know the answer.

[REDACTED] often seemed more focused on resources and quality of life improvements than on interrogation operations. I had members of the brigade staff in Baghdad and members of the brigade at Abu Ghraib working on resourcing issues and I understood that to be the brigade's responsibility - COL PAPPAS held me responsible for infrastructure and resources. [REDACTED] repeatedly brought supply and administrative issues to COL PAPPAS who redirected those issues, appropriately, to me to fix. At one point, I sat down with [REDACTED] at Abu Ghraib and told him that COL PAPPAS needed him to focus on interrogation operations and that the brigade would resource Abu Ghraib; and I asked him to trust that the brigade would get it done as fast as possible, given the constraints of being in Iraq. The brigade had already placed a lot of resources in the JIDC, to include an E-7 [REDACTED] to serve as the JIDC "Mayor" working quality of life issues as the mission expanded. [REDACTED] was there from late September to late October.

I suppose COL PAPPAS saw [REDACTED] role differently than [REDACTED] did because [REDACTED] was sent to Abu Ghraib to do, and [REDACTED] did weigh in on operational issues. I believe [REDACTED] was involved in developing the Joint Manning Document, establishing Tiger Teams, and he seemed to be involved in the handling of several incidents that happened out at Abu Ghraib. When asked if I could recall those incidents, I explained that I did not live out at Abu Ghraib and I was out of Iraq from 12 November to 5 December, but to the best of my recollection, the first incident [REDACTED] was involved in was identifying the A/519th soldiers who conducted inappropriate interrogations of a female detainee. The second incident was the International Community Red Cross (ICRC) visit in October. I do not think the facility was prepared for the visit and the JIDC did not know the ICRC was coming on that day. [REDACTED] had a disagreement with the ICRC concerning access to detainees on 1A and that made the ICRC angry. The third incident was the shooting in 1A on the 24th of November, during which time I was on leave. As it was related to me after I got back to Iraq in December, [REDACTED] and the MPs resolved this issue prior to bringing it to COL PAPPAS' attention. The last incident I recall was the alleged inappropriate treatment of a detainee by a female specialist attached to the 205th. [REDACTED] brought this to COL PAPPAS' attention and told COL PAPPAS that he would discipline and retrain the soldier. In response to a question about how frequently I went to Abu Ghraib, I responded that I traveled to Abu Ghraib once or twice in August and three to four times in September. Our headquarters was still in Balad at that time and it was dangerous to travel back and forth. Once we moved the brigade headquarters to Camp Victory in early October, I would travel to Abu Ghraib once or twice a week. Many high-ranking personnel visited Abu Ghraib and I would often accompany COL PAPPAS as he briefed them and walked them around Abu Ghraib. I was at the Hard Site at least half a dozen times and all of the visits except one were during hours of daylight. Once or twice I was there alone, but usually with a small group.

In response to a series of questions regarding my knowledge of the alleged abuses: I never saw any naked detainees - they wore jumpsuits or civilian clothes; I never witnessed or had any knowledge of any detainee abuse or photos or videos of detainees; I never saw dogs used during interrogations. I did see dogs at the front gate and saw the dogs being walked around the camp.

In response to a question about my observations of the atmosphere, morale and level of training at Abu Ghraib, I stated that the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib changed over time and it changed with every unit. Many of the soldiers in the 519th were upset because they were supposed to redeploy in August but instead were given the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib. I also think that as we transformed from the SFIF to the JIDC there were many changes from the MG MILLER report and from our own assessments that they either did not want to implement or didn't think were necessary - there may have been some bruised egos in the process. My impression was that the 325th soldiers were content to leave Camp Cropper, which was overcrowded, and they looked forward to the new mission. After the 20 September mortar attack that killed two and wounded about 11 soldiers, the soldiers' morale dipped. Then the JIDC began to take shape and had some successes with the intelligence they were producing. It seemed to me that at that point morale improved. In October and November, the JIDC received 25 additional interrogators from INSCOM; they were formalizing interrogation plans and holding weekly targeting meetings and JIDC update briefings with the Tiger Teams; the Magistrate Cell and medical team were in place and it started to look and operate more like a JIDC. In response to a question about whether I thought soldiers were disciplined or not, when I walked through the JIDC it seemed to me that soldiers were disciplined and adhering with Army policies, military customs and courtesies, etc. My expectations were that there were some variations across the board based upon the different units the soldiers came from.

In response to a question about whether it would surprise me to know that some MI soldiers were involved with detainee abuse, I said yes I was surprised. To the question as to how it could have happened I said I did not know - prior to consolidating operations at Abu Ghraib there were three facilities run by three battalions in the brigade and I believed that the soldiers were trained and that those facilities ran without incident. So I did not understand how the same soldiers could have behaved so differently after relocating to Abu Ghraib.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF [REDACTED]

TAKEN AT

WAAF Bldg 1031

DATED

2004/05/19

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

When asked if there was anything I wanted to bring up that the interview did not address, I explained my understanding that the MP Brigade retained control of the access in and out of IA and IB throughout the 205th's tenure at Abu Ghraib.

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?

A. No.

This statement was taken by MG Fay, the procedure 15 Investigating Officer on Thursday May 13th at 1330 hours at the Darmstadt Legal Center, building 4006, Darmstadt Germany. I swore to the statement at the 205th MI Brigade Headquarters, building 1031, Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Wiesbaden Germany on May 19th at 1530 hours.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

[REDACTED]

AFFIDAVIT

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2004 at Bldg 1031 WAAF, Wiesbaden, Germany.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART. 136 UCMTJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301, Title 5 USC Section 2051, E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION DARMSTADT, GERMANY	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2004/05/1	3. TIME 2118	4. FILE NUMBER
5. (LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS SGT	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 302d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE 09102			

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I arrived to Abu Ghraib sometime in September. My MOS is 96B but my duty was to establish the SIPR and High side connectivity for the interrogators (System Administrator and Trojan SPIRIT Operator). When I first arrived there were only a couple of computers. This was a few days after the mortar attack that brought me there (to replace those wounded), after which we started receiving a lot of computers. Our tasks were to set up the computers with the Trojan Spirit connectivity. We would back up the database (on which were photos that were not used for the detainee files that had me delete as appointed local S-2). I never saw any photos of detainees other than those for the detainee folders. I was shocked to learn that everyone was operating out of the tents and they were getting hit with mortars all the time before I got there. After the big mortar attack where we lost some soldiers, we moved operations into the buildings. I did not receive any training when I arrived at Abu Ghraib (other than system administration from my experienced soldier). I did not get trained on the Interrogation Rules of Engagement, the Geneva Convention, what the dos and don't of the MPs were. The focus on the training was on the Tiger Teams at one point in November. Even after CID began their investigation the focus was still on the Tiger Teams. I did feel comfortable that if I saw something I would report it. I never saw any detainee abuse, photos or videos of detainees or the use of dogs for interrogations. We were told not to take photos. I sat in on an interrogation once with A/302nd MI. was brought to Abu Ghraib to interrogate a General. When he arrived, he was told by some interrogators (don't know who) that the detainee was incapable of conducting an interview because they had just interrogated him for 10 hours and they stripped him naked, got him wet and cold and put him in the back of a truck. He was told he would see his son and that is the interrogation that and I conducted. was very calm and asked direct questions. The boy looked scared. He was 16 years old. I told the interrogators the boy should not be there because he was young and was scared of the older men in the camp. I was told that the youngest age in the camp was 16 and therefore he belonged there. I went to the Hard Site one time because I was taken there to see what it looked like. What I saw was MPs constantly yelling at detainees. They were making one guy say his name over and over and over again. If he lowered his voice, they would scream at him. I heard that two interrogators from Fort Bragg had gotten drunk and went to the prison to take out a female prisoner and take their shirt off. The MP on duty saw it, reported the incident and CID began an investigation. The individuals were from the 82nd. (analyst/interrogator) told me that dogs were being used to scare detainees. She said that the detainee had a hood over his head and that one of the MPs would bark like a dog to scare the detainee. The detainee got scared and ran into his cell. thought it was funny. This incident happened in November or December. She told me in December. and also told me that two detainees who had raped a boy (the location of rape unknown) were made to strip down naked and handcuffed in certain contorted positions. They did this themselves. This was told to me in the T-SCIF. They stated the guy got what he deserved. When I returned from leave, was telling a story while in the chow hall. He was telling his friends (do not know who they were) about Abu Ghraib and how crazy it was. He said that MPs were using detainees as practice dummies. They would hit the detainees as practice shots. They would apply strikes to their necks. And knock them out. One detainee was so scared. The MPs held his head and told the detainee it would be all right and then they would do the same thing to the detainee. The detainee would plead for mercy. They all thought it was funny. When the CGS team arrived at Abu Ghraib, they were given a tour of Tier 1 A and B. While they were there, the MI folks were told by MPs that they (MI) could do whatever they wanted with the detainees. They participated in a PT session where they would yell at the detainees. told me this. She said she was disturbed by this and thought this might corrupt the MI folks. There was an older women (she is here in Germany) worked in the out-processing of the Interrogations Control Element (ICE). She has red hair and is in the Army. Her story is that there was no accurate account of detainees being processed and that detainees were being lost in the system (some who didn't belong there in the first place). Detainees were being held too long and not being released. When the ICRC came to visit gathered all the folks in the ICE, about 20-30 folks and told us not to worry about the ICRC concerns because the complaints were about food and general conditions. He said detainees had it better at Abu Ghraib now than when they were under SADAM HUSSEIN. as there plus believe. I expressed to that some of the things I heard and potential problems. The sentiment I got from them

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"  
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.



STATEMENT OF

TAKEN AT

DARMSTADT, GE

DATED

2004/05/11

STATEMENT (Continued)

was acceptable. This happened after I came back from leave in January. [redacted] told me they had the detainees naked while interrogating them and made them put on night underwear. They would tell the MPs to do this. They told me that was well within their authorization. I was also told about [redacted] incident. Nothing was ever done it was kept hush - hush. [redacted] was relieved because he was too harsh with interrogations. (That is what I heard) [redacted] told me that one detainee was so embarrassed to be naked that he made a loin out of MRE bags. They took the MRE bags away from him. I did not report the above incidents because I didn't think I would be listened to or what was being done, though personally offendable, was OK. What I was being told was seemingly well known because of all the involvement and discussions that went on. I was also not acquainted with the Interrogation Operations. I did not know who I could go to. Other times I have reported incidents, I met either retribution or no concern for what I had to say. During the war (Mar-Apr) I reported my OIC for several things he had said and done to me to IG. Instead of the truth being testified to by witnesses, it was meticulously covered up, and ended with me as "the bad guy" (even though the same Battalion commander [redacted] who told me during his findings of the investigation that it was all in my head, told me the day after that he spoke with others and that indeed I was correct but that he was just glad it was over). Also, at Abu Ghuraib I reported to my Brigade S-2 a laptop that I discovered contained a database of SECRET/NOFORN from Afghanistan on it that had been connected to the world wide web (unclassified) for undetermined amount of months, but it was treated as nothing, and the only thing done in this very potentially compromising situation was the laptop being disconnected and placed in the T-SCIF. Also, I had a promotable soldier who just days after being in the same room as alcohol (neither possessing nor consuming) was flagged, told he would get an article 15, and that he would have to go to a removal board (when the situation was unclear). When I went to higher about how ridiculous this was, I was told among other things that I was also to blame. After defending him, the flag was lifted, the article 15 not to happen, but he did in fact go to this removal board, and despite his innocence had his status removed. After getting back from Iraq, me and the soldier went to JAG who directed us to EO who directed us to IG, who then told us they needed a PROPONDERANCE of evidence to do anything (something I was also told during my IG complaint with [redacted] my OIC during the war when I was Targeting NCOIC), and that in reality if someone of higher authority has in for me I am screwed because as long as they mask their actions through regulations, they are untouchable.

Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement?

A. No.

////////////////////////////////////End of Statement////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

[redacted] HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT

[redacted] (Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me a Person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 11th day of MAY 2004 at DARMSTADT GERMANY

[redacted] (Signature of Person Administering Oath)

[redacted] (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136

(Authority To Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT [redacted]

PAGE [redacted] OF [redacted] PAGES

